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DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION IN THE WORK OF ERASMUS*

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IT IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED that religious motives play a decisive role in determining the frames of reference in which societies are acting and being acted upon. However, it remains an open question what specific effects religious elements have in building up the horizons which condition historical structures. These effects can be constructive, preventive, and destructive as seen from a religious or secular point of view. The messianism of the Franciscan Spirituals had consequences which were disastrous for the Church and precarious for body politic. The intellectuals of the imperial court jubilantly took over the Franciscan radicalism as a most effective tool in their anti-ecclesiastical policy. Frederic II cynically transformed the spiritual messianism into messianic imperialism as the secular ideology of an anti-papal international policy. He inaugurated a development which was continued by Charles V and finally came to an end in the secular messianism of modern political and social revolutions. This effect is destructive for church and state alike.

Many religions were strong enough to prevent the growth of secular ambitions for some centuries, at least. Religious convictions, in connection with other causes, prevented the complete expansion of political power into the total state at the beginning of the modern era. Religious indoctrination had created habits which prevented the rise of industrial capitalism in Asia and the Near East.

In the rise of modern Western civilization, religion became a constituent element in the foundations of all political and social institutions. However, there was not any longer *a* Christian religion, but Christian religions. The teachings of the various churches had different effects on the attitudes and patterns of conduct in the respective societies. There is no doubt that the German *Untertan,* with all his negative qualifications as citizen and his positive sides as worker, is deter-

* This article and the one which follows it are products of the Religion and Democracy section of the Columbia University Seminar on Religion. For other papers from this section, the reader is referred to the January, 1948 issue of *The Review of Religion,* and the September, 1949 issue of *Church History.*

mined by Luther's social teachings, whatever might have been the political and social causes which made up the German concatenation of conditions. In genuine Calvinistic countries, as were Geneva and the Netherlands after Dortrecht, a monopolistic aristocracy was the natural form of government.

Perhaps it is a mistake to stress the influence of the churches as the most important one. It goes without saying that their teachings in sermons and schools and their strict disciplines had a strong and habit creating influence. However, there were many psychological and spiritual escapes available. Already prior to the so-called "Reformation," there was a widespread lay piety, independent mystical groups, and spiritual communions apart from the reform movements, which many monastic orders had attacked spontaneously. It is a problem of statistics whether these movements were quantitatively strong enough to be treated with equal attention as the churches. Unfortunately, we cannot answer such questions, because there are no statistical data available for movements which could survive only by hiding their actual beliefs. The historian of liberal and democratic ideas, however, will give his complete attention to these movements, for the simple reason that they started from a spiritual vision which made them antagonistic to the authoritarian control of the leading churches.

Among these movements, Erasmus and the Erasmian movement, for which the Spaniards coined the term *Erasmismo,* have an important contribution to make. His spiritual liberalism, or better his liberal spiritualism, was centered around the idea of Christian liberty. This idea implied the principle of social and political democracy and, in its critical aspect, the grim and disillusioned analysis of disintegrating feudalism and rising military despotism.

Erasmus had chosen freedom as the ruling principle of his life. He explicitly stated again and again that he could not serve. He preferred death to intellectual slavery. He refused the offers of popes and kings who implored him to take ecclesiastical or secular positions. He could not be partisan and had to remain alone in order to preserve his intellectual integrity intact. He was keenly aware that his was a precarious position between the hostile alignments of Catholicism and Lutheranism. He was fighting for the indestructible unity of the Church, not for the existing ecclesiastical institutions. He predicted that Luther's revolution would jeopardize spiritual freedom for a long time

to come. Intellectual and social independence were one and indivisible to Erasmus. He had left monastic orders to get rid of external pressure by coercive institutions and of inner depression caused by his illegitimate birth. He recognized only one passion, the desire for freedom from established authorities. His was the eros of liberty for serving Christ and Logos independently and freely. He had dedicated his life to this service. This voluntary service made him free.

He could realize such independence because the new and revolutionary invention of the printing press liberated him from the alternative of serving an individual or collective employer or starving. After some years of the usual misery as tutor to boys of noble families, he finally succeeded in winning the friendship of Aldus in Venice and of Froben and Amorbach in Basel. These printer families were scholars and businessmen alike and let Erasmus share in the profits of his books and editions. In particular, the Basel printers had established their prestige and reputation as Erasmus' publishers, and generously shared their wealth with him. They had made the poor and insecure tutor a well-to-do and independent scholar whose works were fascinating to the world of learning at the time. His followers, the Erasmians, said that he had improved them. They felt he had given them the courage to be independent beyond the pale of established institutions. They stated that he had delivered their spiritual spontaneity, which they turned to social and political improvements in the interests of their subjects.

Erasmus was not concerned with philosophical and theological ideas and conceptions. Nevertheless, his religious anti-intellectualism and his moral intellectualism made him a forerunner of some trends in positivistic and pragmatistic philosophies. His main concern was, as he frequently stated, a practical one. He desired to prepare the intellectual tools which enabled human beings to become free as Christians by the experience of learning. This principle made his work coherent and logical. It pointed toward a world of free Christian citizens.

He could have formulated his intention in still a different way. He aimed at purifying ecclesiastical and spiritualizing secular institutions in a social situation in which all trends indicated the rapid growth of independent political and economic organizations. In such a moment, Christians had to make a tremendous effort to keep the Christian spirit alive against the pressure of unleashed secular powers. The hierarchical

and aristocratic Church which prayed for the laymen could not stem the tide. The responsible Christian thinker and teacher had to mobilize Christian people and train them as Christian soldiers. They had to fight the inner enemy of greed and passions and the outer enemy of lust for power with the weapons of Christian ethics and its ascetic requirements. Erasmus had escaped monastic orders for many subjective reasons. Objectively, in the trend of his inner development, he had to leave in order to democratize spiritual aristocracy and the religious division of labor as established by the medieval Church. Erasmus states frequently, most emphatically in the farewell letter to the Abbot of Steyn, that the whole world should become a monastery, and that all Christians should live as canons and monks in the world of everyday institutions. Erasmus conceives of the Christian religion as a way of life. It is a universal way of life valid and required for all Christian people. It is an inner-worldly asceticism which permits the control and overcoming of the secular world.

In Erasmus' vision of a spiritual democracy, various trends of religious thinking are merged. He turns the eschatological vision of the Franciscan Spirituals into the theory of inner-worldly asceticism. This was postulated by the historical situation, the corruption of which is admitted by God in order to invite individual souls to improving and proceeding on the road of perfection.

Secondly, Erasmus shifted the mystical experience of Christ as all-pervading Logos into the moral principle of the philosophy of Christ. The philosophy of Christ is the application of Christ's moral teaching to the problems of social conduct as learned experience. It was Erasmus' sincere conviction that we are able to follow Christ's ideals and to imitate Him in truth and spirit if we consciously affirm and understand His yoke as easy. According to Erasmus, charity and science are no alternatives, but are interdependent upon each other. Blind love without knowledge is as impotent as is science without spiritual eros. Erasmus transformed the knowledge of mystical experience into a theory of social and utilitarian piety which is deeply influenced by the moral intellectualism of Socrates and Plutarch.

Erasmus' religion was an effort to ban magic from his path and to establish a religion of pure logos, thus opening the road for Zwingli and Schleiermacher. It seemed to Erasmus that the Church had submitted to the temptations of monopolistic power and had abused the

natural inclinations for magic and superstition which will always prevail among the ignorant. The Church was, for Erasmus, the model case for exemplifying his Law of Degeneracy, which states that all social institutions are subject to the pressure of their organization. For this reason Erasmus invited Christian people to make use of the wonderful invention of the printing press to spread and explain the Gospel and the Epistles. This will make possible the creation of spiritual democracy in which everybody is called upon to be a theologian, because everybody will be able to read and to understand the basic verities of Christian piety.

Erasmus was aware of the sociological and historical conditions and possibilities of Christianity as a way of life for his times. He understood that *Imitatio Christi* could not mean the external mimesis of the apostolic lives and of the first communion. Under modern conditions it means inward living; to live in the world as if we did not live in it and to turn to the Spirit which makes transparent our societal relationships and strengthens our acting and suffering for peace and reconciliation as the fundamentals of spiritual life. The mystical road leads toward the inward, says Novalis, in a truly Erasmian spirit.

Erasmus was always aware of social and historical conditions of religious attitudes. He objected to Luther that the times of Revelation and of listening to the Holy Ghost are gone. What remains is slow progress in the evolution of the understanding of Christ's truth. Christ did not want us to know His overwhelming truth at once. We gain more and more of his wisdom by continuous interpretation and reexamination of documents and texts. Revelation is one and eternal; however, men's organs for listening and understanding are subject to error and deception. For this reason, we must see to it that the variety of religious experience makes for the whole truth, which includes the experience and cognition of the heretics.

Erasmus was striving for a spiritual pluralism founded on a few basic verities taken for granted by the most antagonistic theologians. These verities are the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Creator of the Universe, Logos and Holy Ghost, Christ as Incarnation and Logos, both transcendent and immanent; they imply human obligations to participate in and to contribute to the all pervading spirit of which we are parts. The vision of Erasmus is mystical rather than theological, panentheistic rather than pantheistic. However, the mystical view is

not contemplative, but pragmatic and utilitarian. It leads toward a piety of social and democratic action which alone makes it possible to establish Christian liberty.

Erasmus coined the term "Christian liberty," not Luther. It indicates the goal of the Christian for which the Christian republic is the indispensable condition. The goal is the spiritual sovereignty of man, control of Self, and overcoming the world by inner superiority. Christian perfection is not different from the ideals of the pagans as practiced and described by Socrates, Epictetus, Epicurus, and Plutarch. For this reason Erasmus violently rejects Luther's radical condemnation of everything prior to Christ. "Some have been saved under the Natural Law, many under the Law of Moses, most under the Law of the Gospel: but salvation is properly due not to any law, only to God's pity through Christ." Throughout his work, Erasmus attempts to understand the God of Abraham and the Christ not as historical phenomena which split history into two irreconcilable parts. Erasmus could conceive of religion merely as a universal phenomenon. Religion is natural, not historical. It is a constituent element of nature, mirrored in human thinking and feeling at all times and in all places. It creates everywhere the same ideals and patterns of perfection, which must spring from the same and identical source of the all pervading Logos which is God of Creation, God of mercy, and Christ of pity. Erasmus was intrigued by the lives and sublime ideas of men like Socrates, Cicero, and Epicurus. If they can rightly be called saints, they must have enjoyed the mercy of God and the pity of Christ, the Redeemer. For this reason Erasmus dares to transform an historical religion into the natural religion of all times and places.

Erasmus radically opposed Luther. Nobody has a monopoly of religious truth; none is justified in practicing fanaticism. If we study the true art of piety, we will find that all spiritual roads converge to the divine mansion which is all embracing peace and everlasting reconciliation in all religions. How else could it happen that all religions postulate the same ideal of perfection: gladness of heart, tranquillity of mind, and peace of conscience?

Erasmian liberalism is irreconcilable to any kind of Christian orthodoxy. To Erasmus it was the very essence of Christianity. He could not be a citizen of a national state; he did not want to be a cosmopolitan; he was striving for the citizenship of *Civitas Coelestis.*

From *Antibarbari* to the posthumously published edition of Origen, Erasmus has pursued the idea that the best religion comes to its highest perfection and has its greatest effect when supported by the best learning. Best learning is to Erasmus the humanities, not philosophy, for the humanities deal with God's manifestations as expressed through and as logos; to Erasmus they presented the immediate and spontaneous presence of the Divine. This is the inner meaning of his philology.

Erasmus formulated his position most articulately in the prefaces to the Fathers whom he edited or translated into Latin. His selection is already indicative. He chose those who, like Jerome and Origen, assumed that man is a free intelligence, and that the eros toward God and the Good is inherent in the natural moral conscience. These Fathers knew that many approaches lead to God; they loved their cotheologians in spite of dissenting opinions. They were keenly aware that dogmatic formulations were the product of a sociological emergency, strengthened by hostile pressure from without and by competing sects from within. Erasmus believed it possible to find in their writings his own conviction that faith was a way of life rather than a conceptual frame. According to Erasmus, the Fathers connected faith and learning in order to be the educators of the Christian people, who had the task of turning faith into living piety of social action. For this purpose, he unified Christian faith with pagan spiritualism as the true synthesis of the good life.

Ambrose had established the ideal of the Christian educator whose conduct and work should bring social peace. "Magnum pondus habet morum integritas, magnam habet auctoritatem coniuncta mansuetudini constantia. Plurimum valet eloquentiae copulata prudentia." This was the ideal Erasmus hoped to realize in his life and work.

It is of no avail to investigate whether Erasmus interpreted the Fathers correctly. He certainly did not. He understood them as he wanted himself to be understood. He wished to connect Christ and Epicurus, Socrates and Paul. His concern was to educate free Christian citizens and to make the elite devoted servants to the realization of Christ in the here and now. In this daring enterprise he stimulated and promoted all trends toward liberal and democratic institutions and patterns of conduct.

Erasmus' religious position implied three postulates. First, he was

deeply concerned with the social standards of society and, in particular, with the lot of the poor and suffering classes. Second, his spiritualism makes possible an analysis of the prevailing social institutions which is as grim and disillusioned as that of Macchiavelli. Third, his social and utilitarian piety recommends the transfer of monastic rules to social institutions in order to create the conditions under which Christian liberty could be realized.

Erasmus anticipated the theories of political liberalism by recognizing society as the bearer of social evolution. Society is the sum total of the diverse rational activities of man which make possible security, well being, and peace. Farmers, burghers, urban citizens in commerce, industry, and crafts work toward these goals. The urban societies are the resources from which the professions draw their best and strongest forces. Among urban groups arose the enthusiasm for the New Learning. In the urban centers, Erasmus found the liberal attitudes which required participation in and restriction of political power. He had studied experimentally the world of patrician and bourgeois societies in London, Antwerp, and other cities. He was intimately associated with the scholar-printers of Venice and Basel, to whom he was friend and business partner. His practical experience enabled him to compare the new economic developments in modern industries, such as printing, with past economic institutions, and to reconsider the relationships between economic societies and the state.

It would be as easy as misleading to understand Erasmus' attitudes as determined by his bourgeois interests and his class situation. His piety is, indeed, conditioned by his having grown up in the lay mysticism of Dutch urban societies. However, his "vested interests" are the growth of spiritual democracy and the progress of intellectual liberty, both united in his Socratic and Christian piety.

In his analyses of various social strata, Erasmus discloses a definite sympathy for the poor and lower middle classes, for two reasons. They are the productive classes whose labors produce the wealth of society. There he finds a thoroughly urbanized population, many small and middle-sized towns which are well and intelligently administered, because a steady and moderate well-being prevails in all strata of society. This can easily be explained. They are the markets for the abundant rural products and import just as many goods as are necessary for balancing the prices. Erasmus praises the character of these classes.

Labor, being the center of their lives, has constructive effects on their conduct and mutual relationships. Labor has an "influence on discipline of the individual and on the control of his passions." Labor frequently contributes to making man moderate and considerate in his relations to his fellowmen. Labor is sacred because it is the tool for building up the family. It is sacred because it maintains the blessing and happiness of a family by the mutual co-operation of husband and wife. Labor is an indispensable device of inner-worldly Christianity. It is as relevant as frugality and thrift for establishing Christian liberty and for avoiding the pitfalls of wealth and luxury for spiritual independence.

Erasmus never ceased to praise such character traits as belonging to the modest middle classes. He was not aware of the political implications of his analyses. Throughout his work, he describes the societal relationships between husband and wife in a family, between friends and partners in business, in such a way that all differences in authority and status are eliminated by the emphasis on co-operative labor for realizing religious values. Erasmus suggests a social democracy which we could easily call Christian Social Democracy.

He was much concerned about the political and social situation of these groups under the control of disintegrating social classes and integrating absolutistic institutions. He was familiar with the plight of the peasants and of the urban proletariat. His sympathies were with the oppressed, although his reasoning was for preserving the status quo. He was of the opinion that a conscientious scholar could not recommend a revolution which would serve the progress of more cruel and oppressive despotism. However, he longed for the renascence of the extinct race of Brutus, which had its distinct function in epochs of despotism. Erasmus even recognized bravely and frankly, against his own preferences, that revolutions might have their own legitimacy in situations of despair.

He watched with deep sympathy the uprising of the peasants and the proletariat. He was personally attacked by a French Carthusian (December, 1524) and by the syndic of the Sorbonne (May, 1525), Noel Bede, and described as the author of the religious and social revolutions. His was the responsibility for the disintegrating society, because he had spread the libertine spirit of humanistic philosophy, according to these critics. He serenely rejected the accusations and clearly hinted

at the social and political motives at the roots of such desperate actions. He had rather impeach the rulers than blame the people. He suspected all the time that feudal lords and princes would welcome the uprisings as an opportunity for strengthening their domination and exploitation. He was keenly aware that the German feudal class, in its state of decomposition, would gladly make use of all possibilities for overthrowing the wealthy elite of urban societies and take over their riches. In this connection, as in his analysis of Luther, we find remarkable observations on the German character. There he asked himself why the Germans are so much better in violent punishment of evils than in their prudent prevention.

In contrast to these sympathetic analyses, stands Erasmus' extremely critical description of the bourgeois elite, the patrician, the honored rich. Though with Aristotle he recognized that perfect happiness requires a material fortune, he criticized those who praised Roman law because it established security in business by regulating commerce and interest rates. He thought that these commercial societies combined daring and reason. The new forms of interest seemed to him reasonable and he did not blame the various groups of bankers. He admitted that these men could defend their activities with a clear conscience. Christ has forbidden, not clever activity, but the tyrannical lust for profit. However, he condemned the daring of international commerce as practiced by the patricians of Antwerp, for he could study in detail the effects of these emancipated economic forces on the common people and could observe everywhere the ruthless exploitation of the masses by economic monopolies. He complained no less of the free competition in new industries, where anyone could undertake an enterprise, and where the law failed to protect already existing ones and did not question the need for new establishments.

His attitude toward the new world was characteristic of a conservative liberal. On the one hand, he recognized the positive and constructive elements in the new urban societies, their efforts to control nature and to build a better economic and social world. Anticipating Veblen, he remarked that the new branches of financial and commercial speculation are completely independent of the economic needs of the common people, and that they gamble on the urgently needed goods of life. This is, in Veblen's terminology, a new leisure class; in Erasmus' language, the most wicked and the most honored group of wealthy

people—honored by the political elite, because their wealth is needed to stabilize the rising national state.

Erasmus was struck by this aspect of the interrelationship of state and society. He saw society splitting into the working classes on the one hand, and the strata of economic power joined to the political and the princes, on the other. He was haunted by such visions and spoke of the conspiracy between the nobility and the rich to exploit the people and establish an absolute state for the destruction of civil liberties. He was fully aware that this unholy union of power and wealth would have its implications for foreign affairs. There were too many warmongers striving for economic gains and exploiting the ideology of the Crusades for profit, for example, by manipulation of the sugar market. He drew conclusions from these facts, and, in a formula as Marxist as that of Thomas More, he stated that the body politic was nothing but a tremendous business machine.

But, in spite of complete disillusionment on the trend of political evolution, he insisted on government interference in economic and social affairs, in order to maintain the lowest level of standards, at least, for the common people. It was a main concern of his to protect consumers from exploitation by tradesmen who manipulated prices in a criminal manner. The state must intervene for purely utilitarian reasons, to prevent violent rebellion. Throughout his works, Erasmus demanded control of prices, weights and measures, economic combines, market procedures, and quality of food. Without such regulation, the situation of the common people would be disastrous.

Equally important seemed to him a general reform of taxation. From 1517 to the end of his life, he never ceased to draw the attention of the rulers to the continuous threat of revolution implicit in the unequal distribution of taxes, most of which were paid by the common people. He suggested three expedients for the intelligent ruler: first, limitation of the expenses of crown and court; second, a heavy import tax on luxury goods, to be borne by the rich; third, a kind of excess profit tax to prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands of the few; and fourth, light taxation of necessary commodities, such as bread, wine, beer, and clothing, for, actually, it is the poor who bear the heaviest burden from taxation of consumer goods. And this load is further aggravated by the methods employed by the framers of tax laws to enrich themselves. Frequently Erasmus raised his voice against their unjust practices.

Attacked by his enemies for infringing upon the authority of the emperor, he made a distinction between the rights of a ruler and the misdeeds of his administration. He bravely maintained that, in absolute monarchies, the people are completely broken by disastrous taxation, and called attention to the tradition of the Dutch Provinces and Burgundy, where the provincial assemblies must give their consent to all taxes. He recalled the fact that Charles V and his brother, Ferdinand, had never objected to his independent suggestions on tax reform. In his old age, Erasmus extended his ideas of reform still further. In discussing the possibility of war against the Turks, he warned the rulers to redistribute the tax burden. The poor, being completely exhausted already through monopolies and taxes, should not be forced again to bear the entire war tax. This would only increase the spirit of revolt. The rulers can appease the masses only by introducing radical parsimony in their own economy and moderate taxation of ecclesiastical wealth.

Erasmus anticipated modern liberalism by limiting the state to the function of integrating, unifying, and protecting the different groups of society. The state is a necessary aspect of society. Erasmus granted its positive function as long as the body politic remained instrumental to establishing the conditions for spiritual liberty. He was well aware that such postulates derived merely from spiritual hypotheses. He was too well versed in the history of the Roman Empire (he had been the editor of the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*) and of the Church to have any doubt about the collective dynamics of institutions of power. As early as the first edition of the *Encheiridion*, he had established the *Lex Degenerandi* for all social institutions and described how, necessarily, all institutions are subject to the laws of expansion and power in order to maintain themselves. As in many other observations, Erasmus set the pattern for another liberal from Basel, J. B. Burckhardt, in his analysis of power.

For this reason it is not surprising to see Erasmus, like Macchiavelli, following the classical tradition of political philosophy as established by Aristotle and carried on by Polybius and Cicero (in *De Legibus*), which proclaimed the mixed constitution or the monarchical republic the best political constitution.

The fundamental differences and the final affinities between Macchiavelli and Erasmus are obvious in the perennial ambivalence be-

tween state and society. The phenomenon of power was the principle of evil for Erasmus, the principle of reality for Macchiavelli. The fundamental difference from Macchiavelli led, however, to the political ideal of a limited monarchy or of a mixed constitution. Erasmus, the councillor of Charles V, had never failed to express frankly his deep contempt for the rule of an absolute monarch. From the *Adages* until his old age and the essay on the Turkish War, he openly proclaimed the irrationality and self-centered character of monarchs; he ridiculed the so-called heroic kings of Homer, and complained of the barbaric temper of modern monarchs who never enjoyed a careful education for their responsibilities. The feudal classes are no better than the kings. Both together are eager to exploit and destroy the wealth produced by the people's labor. The dynamics of power which do not refer to a frame of spiritual meaning lead again and again to the pursuit of unleashed desires and insatiable greed. For this reason, Erasmus sees the image of the tyrant as the eternal possibility of unlimited monarchies. A tyrant will treat his people as property and make himself absolute master. He will inspire fear and breed mutual suspicion. This is despotism. According to Erasmus, every sort of despotism degrades human beings and destroys human dignity. It is, like anarchy, beyond the pale of political institutions. Political control is administration, never domination. Almost literally, Erasmus presents the thesis of a liberal sociologist, Max Weber, that control means administration.

His proposals for checking arbitrariness and despotic tendencies are sociological rather than political or legal. Erasmus is neither a Macchiavelli, nor a Montesquieu, because his main concern is not the world of secular institutions, but *Res Christiana*. Social alliances, however, might create a balance of power in the state. He suggests, first, that the city states should enter an *entente cordiale* with the industrial classes. Such power might enable them to limit the tyranny of the feudal and military classes. Second, he thinks it indispensable to restrict political authority by constitutional bonds. A mixed constitution is the wisest form of government. It is the wisest because it takes into consideration the fundamental mutuality of societal relationships and the lasting social problem of reconciling the individual with collective institutions. He bases the constitution on the mutual consensus of ruler and ruled. Princes and peoples should respect each other and rely on mutual good will. By introducing the idea of mutuality and con-

sensus, Erasmus transfers his idea of spiritual democracy to the political plane. Authority and liberty should be distributed in such a way among the different social strata as to secure the harmony of the whole. For this purpose, intermediary groups should be organized and local self-government should perform political functions.

These suggestions follow classical traditions, as mentioned above. They are, however, not bookish but, realistic, as were his debunking analyses of society and political elite. Macchiavelli had referred his mixed constitution to the legal institutions of France. Erasmus could have illustrated his idea by describing the autonomous constitution of the Dutch Provinces within the Habsburg Empire, as an almost independent body politic within the Empire. The executive power was in the hands of the Chancellor of Burgundy, who was supported and elected by the Councils of State which represented the noble families. The General Estates represented the people as a whole. They were the delegates of the Provincial Estates and voted the taxes for the whole body politic. Such a system of checks and balances will prevent anarchy and tyranny. It follows the general pattern of medieval constitutions, which are based on the mutual obligations of rulers and Estates. The ruler takes the oath to preserve the liberties and rights of the Estates, and these promise to defend the common good. When the Dutch revolted against Spain, they acted as true Erasmians. Philip II had broken his pledges—and thus broken the constitutional bonds.

There is still another source of Erasmus' liberalism. It stems from the religious sphere, which is constituted by the lasting interdependence and interaction of ecclesiastical authority and Christian liberty of the individual. Both belong together for securing the continuous growth of the spiritual life. Here, again, a mixed constitution of monarchic, aristocratic, democratic elements in the organization of the ecclesia deeply influenced the thought of Erasmus. The institution should see to it that the human being has a fence and a guide for coming into his own. The individual should watch the objective institutions to prevent their becoming ends in themselves. The individual, of course, is not an end in itself, but the representative of a Divine meaning whose kingdom the person enlarges by establishing spiritual liberty. Erasmus' thought is centered around *Res Christiana,* which sets the pattern for all societal relationships and social institutions. Mixed constitution means to Erasmus exactly the political establishment that

makes possible the freedom of the spiritual person in his devotion to the religious goods.

It is a specific aspect of Erasmus' spiritual liberalism that he requests the political ruler to establish a pattern of ascetic life as most appropriate to his secular position. It is appropriate for very pragmatic reasons. The common people have lost respect for the professional asceticism of the orders. Widespread are the movements of mystical lay piety which preach voluntary asceticism to transform Christianity into a general way of life. The prince is the highest representative of society whose conduct establishes the consensus of the people and the unity of the state. He is subject to the same laws that bind his subjects. He is more responsible to the moral laws, because it was his duty to protect and improve the lot of the common people. His is a "secular calvary" in the decisions and actions as ruler. For this reason, the Christian prince cannot divide his secular and spiritual behavior. The truth of Christ appears in our conduct. It is the privilege of the prince to set the pattern of the indivisible unity of secular and spiritual life in his ascetic conduct. In his letter to Francis I, Erasmus uses the symbol of the two swords for describing the duties of rulers. However, he applies the term not in the sense of legal delegation. Legal thinking is unfamiliar to Erasmus. He turns it to an interpretation which indicates subjective and objective aspects of participation in Christ. The ruler who carries the blessed sword is obliged to promote the objective goods of Christ as peace, concord, reconciliation, and to defend such status. The foremost example of Christian liberty is the ruler's total devotion and subjection to the obligations of patriarchal care for his people. This is the objective aspect of the spiritual theory of politics.

There remains the subjective side of the Erasmian theory. Erasmus interprets the term as indicating the subjective obligation of the ruler to follow Christ. The political ruler should live in the *imitatio Christi* in order to direct and unite the consensus of ruler and people to the spiritual meaning of the organized life of society. Against the irrationality of human passions which strive to satisfy individual or collective selfishness, Erasmus creates a barrier in a social spiritualism. The ruler as saint is an Erasmian postulate which indicates a new trend in the relationship between temporal and spiritual spheres. This is no longer the tradition of medieval political philosophy, which carefully distinguished political and ecclesiastical realms. Erasmus inaugurated a

new attitude toward the world. His social spiritualism closes the dualism of the medieval world between the spiritual and secular areas. It indicates the indissoluble unity of the religious and temporal as integrated by the practical Christ in all social institutions. Princes, clergy, and the Christian People are one republic, not a hierarchy. This world is a republic, because Christ is the center of the social whole and integrates the varieties of functions into the unity of living action of society. All members of the republic should refer their tasks to the living spirit of Christ, which is peace, concord, and reconciliation. It is Erasmus' main concern to point out that peace is the *telos* of divine creation, because it is the inner meaning of Christ and Logos alike. Peace is never a social status, but a lasting process, a problem which all groups have to solve again and again. Erasmus has illuminated the conditions for peace on all levels of society. He analyses relationships among friends, husband and wife, dissenting clergy, rulers and ruled. In all cases he comes to the conclusion that peace can be established when enough prudence and wisdom make possible sympathetic understanding. This can be created by that part of the relationship which is capable of the stronger educational eros.

For this reason Erasmus turned all social and political analyses to the problems of war and peace as the fundamental problems of individual and collective relationships. He dealt with the problem of war and peace in church, state, and social institutions. He recognized three valid motives for going to war in an emergency situation. He protested violently against the charge of having preached total pacifism. He never ceased investigating the causes and motives which disturb peace and produce wars. In these analyses he is as cautious and disillusioned as in the analyses of social and political institutions. He admits a strictly defensive war in order to repel invaders. He reluctantly grants the war against the Turks if it serves the purpose of protecting the survival of Christian civilization, or of spreading the Christian religion. For this reason, he develops a third category, which he takes seriously, although he seems to limit it to pre-Christian societies. He speaks of the war of civilized nations against barbarians as legitimate political action. He refers to pagan emperors who fought easy and unbloody wars and improved the social and economic conditions of the conquered. Sometimes their clemency reconciled the vanquished and raised their standards.

He mentions the last category mainly in order to remark that these

three cases did not play any role among the Christian princes during the preceding two decades. He classified the actual motives leading toward military conflict between states. (1) There are always personal motives among the rulers which still play an important role. Glory and prestige of the monarchs, personal superiority and pride, inferiority and anger frequently contribute to producing war. (2) There are vested interests among the advisors of kings to drive toward war; the military and young courtiers who want to make their careers, will always favor war. (3) There are the legal advisors and the learned statesmen who reinterpret treaties and alliances again and again. They are possessed by the idea of expansion, which is more an expression of fear and insecurity than of strength and competition. He knows, although he does not formulate it, that these men are subject to the logic of the body politic. They contend that laws of nature, laws of society, custom and usage compel them to repel force by force and defend life, and money too, which is, to some persons, as dear as life. Erasmus is willing to grant such arguments as valid for pagan statesmen. He rejects them for the Christian world. He refuses to acknowledge the logic and necessity of expansion. This is a never ending process if taken as necessary. He wishes to reduce the *pragma* of power to psychological motives of fear, anger, and ambition. However, he sees very clearly that there are motives which cannot be reduced to individual psychology. (4) The elite wage war for social reasons in order to break the unity of society and oppress and exploit it without resistance. (5) Similarly, the establishment of despotism is best secured by a victorious war which increases the material and moral power of the ruler and of the military. These domestic reasons cannot be reduced to individual psychology. They are truly sociological motives. (6) Finally, he sees that rich and prosperous administrations and flourishing societies attract war loving neighbors, as did France twice in twelve years.

Erasmus derived his critical analysis from a comprehensive observation of his world. He was well acquainted with rulers and their councillors: many Erasmians were in leading positions and gave him information about matters of state which he was eager to receive. This material made him as disillusioned about the ways of politics as the statesmen who have practiced them. Actually, he developed all the sociological theories on military expansion which have been elaborated scientifically since the development of separate social sciences.

Erasmus was not a defeatist, in spite of his conviction that the au-

tonomous state is evil in itself, but he was certainly not an optimistic man of the Enlightenment, as he is frequently presented. He was a reformer, nevertheless, though he never believed that his political and social treatises would have any influence on the princes and rulers to whom they were addressed. However, he was well aware that his opinions, made public, would strengthen the position and action of the learned councillors and civil statesmen to come to a fair deal by compromise. The sociologist might remark that one of his evolutionary accomplishments was the establishment of a kind of public opinion among the learned and educated classes, a remarkable contribution to democracy. This is conspicuous in his various suggestions on avoiding war and establishing firm and permanent peace. These ideas range from reconsidering legal and political habits to manipulating public opinion, and to elevating the sentiments of the common people.

First, he detests the role of jurists in the conduct of foreign affairs. They abuse the spirit of law by distorting its letter, and are not afraid of forging documents in making legal claims. They have completely submitted to the political rulers. They applied the legal formulations of treaties to hiding their true purposes and providing for future claims. They rationalize fear and suspicion in such documents. For this reason, Erasmus desires the utmost limitation of treaties and alliances because of their psychological effects on mutual feelings of insecurity. Second, he holds one specific type of treaty responsible for many wars, and condemns political marriages. Again and again these contracts lead to conflict on succession and inheritance rights; hence, he wishes them abolished. Third, he would like to see the princes surrounded by learned and responsible civilians, who would be able to check the influence of ambitious generals and of young courtiers, who are always in favor of war for advancing their careers. Such advisors could turn the royal good will toward the social and economic problems of the people, the improvement of which would have its effect on the economic power of the state. Thus the princes would discover that inner prosperity is preferable to outer adventure.

The most serious proposal of Erasmus is the postulate that no war should be waged which has not the full and unanimous consent of the people. This is most indicative of his political stand, which is so frequently misinterpreted. Even if "people" does not mean the modern mass democracy, it means, at least, all political assemblies of the Es-

tates, which would be a democratic device for the sixteenth century anyway. These suggestions are constructive. They are followed by some negative recommendations which imply the positive attitude. If war is inescapable, it should be conducted in such a way that the severest calamities may fall upon the leader of those who gave the occasion. Repeatedly he states that in war the innocent and peaceful suffer most: landholders and tradesmen, manufacturers and husbandmen. People who have vested interests in war, however, such as courtiers, kings, bankers, remain in safety and get rich. They are eager to forget that you can buy peace if you invest in just causes, and compromise with an unjust enemy in order to preserve the well being and the future progress of the people.

Erasmus is aroused by the techniques of propaganda which the warmongers use to incite the common people and to create hatred against enemies. He resents the idol of national glory. He takes it for granted that people everywhere accept their habits and mores as natural and those of the foreigner as funny and strange, but he knows, as well, that people do not necessarily draw the conclusion that they are superior to others. Common people everywhere know that they live in a communion of suffering under the bad will of their rulers. Kings and their courtiers invented the phantom of national glory which is the identification of their vain ambitions with the destiny of peace loving people. Erasmus is too sensitive a scholar of language not to be shocked by its manipulation for inflaming the sentiments of the common people. He mentions one specific case which anticipates Nazi methods against France and England, and was probably used by the Spanish-Dutch bureaucracy for breaking the national unity of France. These warmongers addressed the civil populations of some northwestern French area and attempted to confuse the inhabitants by recalling their historical origins and calling them Germans. He despises this kind of warfare and demands its abolishment. He revolts against making peace loving common people the victims of sophisticated official warmongers and propaganda chiefs. His formulation leads to contemporary content analysis:

> Such is the depravity of their minds that they seek occasions of difference where none is afforded either by nature or institution. They would divide France against herself, in verbal and nominal distinctions of the inhabitants, a country which is not divided by seas or mountains, and is one and indivisible, how-

ever men endeavor to carve divisions into it by distinctions merely nominal. Thus some of the French they will denominate Germans, lest the circumstances of identity of name should produce that unanimity which they diabolically wish to interrupt.

Finally, Erasmus turns his critical suggestions on Church and clergy, whose behavior was the hardest blow to a sincere educator of mankind, as Erasmus was. Popes and high dignitaries of the Church waged war and instigated military conflicts, instead of reconciling the adversaries. Young priests, like courtiers, were anxious to become army chaplains in order to be promoted. Without legal coercion, they completely submitted to the state and preached Christ on either side of the fence. Erasmus explains this perverse phenomenon by a sociological analysis. The Church has become the victim of its own imperialistic control over the political world as a body politic. The clergy could not avoid intercourse with the world; it could not escape accumulating and hoarding the goods which the world values. In this process, the men of the Church have gradually adopted the manners of the world, even in the retreat of the monastic orders, where antagonistic "vested interests" clash with each other and raise violent conflicts among Christian institutions. Erasmus never forgot the experience at Bologna when he saw the triumphant entrance of victorious Julius II, clad in shining armor. It is the urgent duty of pope and clergy to relinquish confounding temporal and spiritual values and to work continuously for realizing the Christian League and to offer their disinterested services as arbitrators. This suggestion refers to the Holy See and the diplomacy of the higher clergy.

Erasmus offered yet two more suggestions which pertain to the national clergy in the independent states. He was convinced that people and rulers would be deeply shocked and would reconsider waging war if the respective clergies would refuse burial in consecrated grounds to those slain in battle, instead of blessing their arms. The clergy should see to it that they debunk military romanticism and national vanity. They could do it easily if they would refuse religious blessings to the trophies of war.

Clergy do not hesitate to hang up flags, standards, banners and other trophies of war, brought from the field of carnage as ornaments of churches. . . . These trophies . . . all stained and smeared with the blood of men for whom Christ shed his blood, are hung in the churches among the tombs and images of

apostles and martyrs as if in future it were to be reckoned a mark of sanctity not to suffer martyrdom but to inflict it, not to lay down one's own life for the truth, but to take the lives of others for worldly purposes of vanity and avarice. It would be quite sufficient if the bloody rags were hung in some corner of the Exchange. . .

These propositions indicate Erasmus' will to contribute pragmatically to the fundamental problems of war and peace. He stated time and again that his relativistic pacifism was a constituent of his political thought and of his spiritual doctrine of man. The question of war is primarily a moral and human, not a legal, phenomenon. The just war is hell as compared to an unjust peace, for war is the most atrocious of all crimes. It corrupts all moral and religious standards among victors and vanquished alike, it is an economic disaster for both. Finally, it is the most terrible calamity for the common people, for whom Christ shed his blood as much as for the rich and the princes. For this reason, the sublime rulers and sympathetic princes should overlook offenses and injuries in order not to jeopardize the tranquility and well-being of their subjects. They are well aware that, in a Christian world, there is not domination, but patriarchal administration. Ruler and people are united by mutual confidence and trust, because they live in the orbit of Christian liberty to which every human being is called. Spiritual democracy is the basis for political democracy.

The analyses of various social strata illuminate his religious concern. According to Erasmus, it is primarily a *spiritual* responsibility of the ruling elite to secure standards of life for the middle classes which make it possible to realize the Christian way of life. It must be emphasized that Erasmus prescribes as *religious* duty what medieval authors considered *political* obligations. It is, of course, correct to say that all social rules—as they appear in Erasmus—focus on past philosophical treatises. However, the frame of reference has changed. Erasmus rejects the division of labor between ecclesia and laity. Laity will co-operate in establishing Christ's teaching and image in the here and now, and in the routine of everyday life. This implies an organization of society in which elements of democracy are inevitable, whatever may be the distribution of status and authority.

His analyses of the state of societies and of their political institutions led him to the conclusion that they were rushing toward new kinds of coercive organizations. He characterized them as victims of the strong-

est organized power, such as princes wealthy enough to hire powerful armies with which to establish a military despotism. This will be the end of political and civil liberties, of the authority of Estates, and of political consensus. This is not any longer a body politic, because any kind of despotism is, like anarchy, beyond the pale of rational political constitutions. Such a modern type of government can only be compared to the Roman principate and the regime of the barrack emperors.

He summarized his findings on the grim logic of the autonomy of social institutions and of collective pressure in a grave statement which is totally different from the serene discovery of this sociological rule in the *Praise of Folly*. It is significant that he made this remark in a theological commentary. "Habet et hic mundus ordinem suum quam non expedit a nobis perturbari" is his conclusion.

Erasmus is never mentioned in textbooks on history of political and social ideas. This can be justified because his main concern was *Res Christiana,* which meant to him the merging and unifying of spiritual and social spheres and the establishment of Christianity as a way of life leading toward Christian liberty. This last heroic effort of the Christian world was finally defeated in the Puritan Revolution. What remained were the elements of political and social thought which are the foundations of modern democracy and liberalism.

For this reason, it must be regretted that modern histories of social ideas still remain silent on Erasmus and Social Spiritualism. This might even be considered a grave omission, for Erasmus makes evident that democratic and individual liberties *from* despotism are constructive merely as freedom *to* serve supreme goods and spiritual ideals. Erasmus knew that all social institutions may easily turn to despotic practices when broken loose from a philosophical or spiritual frame of reference. He was imbued with the spirit of social spiritualism. This was not a pattern of Utopian thinking. Rather was it the proposition of reform—*quand même!* He called upon individual souls to change; he did not trust a general transformation of social institutions.

Hence he was not a political philosopher at all. What, then, was his field and contribution? He had refused to be called a theologian, and he was not a philosopher. He wanted to be a philologist and educator. As lover of logos, Erasmus felt himself to be in the service of God and Christ, who are all pervading Logos. He served society by preparing youth for listening to the logos in themselves and for taking it as

traditions and learning. He explicitly distinguished his calling from that of a scholar. The scholar is concerned with *establishing* truth for the sake of truth among fellow scholars. The educator is called upon to spread truth for the sake of its effects on our lives. Erasmus considered its improving effects on human minds. He did not mean "moral improvement" in a narrow sense. As lover of logos, the educator should see to it that his students were enlightened on their social obligations and illuminated on their spiritual responsibilities. As a Christian Socrates, Erasmus was convinced that understanding these truths meant realizing them in our very lives. Moral and spiritual learning as a way of life lead to Christian liberty, tranquility of mind, and peace of conscience—ideals of human perfection on which pagans and Christians agree, Epicurus and Christ.

Education opens the avenues to this goal. For this reason all social institutions are to be transformed into institutes of education. Church, state, and family are schools on various planes of living which should elaborate their respective logoi and stimulate the participation of all who share in the all pervading Logos. Thus the content of history is the Education of Mankind. From Erasmus a straight road leads to Lessing.

However, there is no universal law of progress. Progress remains a lasting tradition of learning and interpretation. It co-exists with the lasting *lex degenerandi* in all social institutions. It has no lasting effect in transforming society. Human nature will remain the same: *never* will Pharisee-ism die out; *never* will the freedom of the Gospel not be attacked by ecclesiastics; *never* will the world stop persecuting the saints to the end of the world; *never* will pious and sincere people be more than a tiny flock.

The world of institutions is evil. Perfection is possible to the individual soul dedicated to the imitation of Christ and Socrates, through whom he participates in a larger whole. For those souls, democratic institutions must exist in church and state in order to open the avenues to Christian people who are not afraid to take upon themselves the hardships of learning and the adventures of knowing for the sake of realizing Christian liberty.

FREEDOM OF PRAYER

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I

IN PREVIOUS STUDIES I have tried to show that the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the end of the first half century of American national existence, marked the serious beginning of a drive for an orthodox reinterpretation of the concept of religious freedom.[1] The last important positive application of the concept in its individualist, Jeffersonian interpretation came with the end of a thirty-year fight for full civil rights for the Jews of Maryland in 1826.[2] Typical of early attempts to reformulate religious freedom as "freedom for religion" was that of Ezra Stiles Ely's 1827 trial balloon, his Independence Day address entitled, "The Duty of Christian Freemen to Elect Christian Rulers."[3] The change was in part, at least, the result of the formation of national denominational and interdenominational organizations during the decade 1810-1820.[4] It may also have been due in part to the swing of the pendulum from the extreme rationalism of Thomas Paine's *Age of Reason.*[5]

I cannot resist the conclusion that the chief reason for the almost frantic activity of the Christian groups was their realization that half

1. For the basic outline of this series of studies and a general orientation, see "The Free-Born Mind," *Review of Religion,* IX (November, 1944), 31-41. Some of the relevant documents, with interpretations, are included in my *Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in America* (Boston, 1949).

2. See "The Maryland 'Jew Bill,'" *Review of Religion,* VIII (March, 1944), 227-39.

3. The full text of this address is included in my *American Philosophic Addresses, 1700-1900* (New York, 1946), pp. 548-62; see also my discussion, "The Christian Party in Politics," *Review of Religion,* XI (November, 1946), 18-35.

4. 1810, The American Board of Foreign Missions; 1816, The American Bible Society; 1817, The American Sunday School Union. These were supplementary to the formation of national organizations by five Christian denominations.

5. There is need for a careful and objective study of this reaction to Paine's work and of the influence in inducing the reaction of the American printings of such books and pamphlets as R. Watson's *Apology for the Bible in a Series of Letters Addressed to Thomas Paine* (Philadelphia, 1796), D. Simpson's *Plea for Religion and the Sacred Writings addressed to the disciples of Thomas Paine and wavering Christians of every persuasion* (Philadelphia, 1825), R. Thomson's *Divine Authority of the Bible; or, Revelation and Reason, opposed to Sophistry and Ridicule: Being a Refutation of Paine's Age of Reason* (Boston, 1807), etc.

a century of successful government had been achieved under the direction of men who (however they may be considered religious, or even Christian, by our standards) were, by the standards of that earlier age, largely infidels and deists. Even the first six presidents of the United States, although they retained their membership in various churches, fell in with the deistic pattern of piety toward the source of being without emphasis on the doctrinal positions of their churches. As for the seventh, Andrew Jackson, it remains to be shown that he even considered religion worthy of thought. Small wonder that the Christian denominations, faced by the necessity of saving themselves, formed the second great pressure group in our nation's history.[6]

Questions of cause aside, the phase of this drive of orthodox Christians for restoration of power with which I am concerned here is the sustained effort to open public assemblies, particularly legislative assemblies, with prayer. What makes this issue of special interest at the present time, as will appear in the sequel, is that the issue has recently been raised in reference to the sessions of the United Nations Assembly and has, therefore, become a matter of immediate concern. It is my intention, however, to set forth an exemplary historical instance before discussing this contemporary situation.

In a letter to Edward Livingston in 1822, James Madison called attention to the then-recent appointments of legislative chaplains to Congress; he remarked that it was without his approval that this "deviation" from complete separation of church and state had taken place in Congress "when they appointed chaplains, to be paid from the National Treasury." If the congressmen wanted to reassure their constituents of their "pious feelings," they might have achieved this reassurance more effectively "if the members had contributed for the purpose, a pittance from their own pockets."[7] That this attitude was not casual is evident from an essay left by Madison in manuscript and published first in 1914 in *Harpers Magazine*. In this article, Madison was concerned with the dangers to American liberties involved in the growth

6. The first was, of course, the manufacturing interest, which created a vociferous and clamorous, if not particularly numerous support for the policies enunciated in Alexander Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures*. Here, as in so many other cases, Christianity followed trade.

7. Madison to Livingston, July 10, 1822, cited in William A. Blakely, *American State Papers on Freedom in Religion*, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C., 1943), p. 173.

of monopolies of all sorts. Particularly, he asserted, "the danger of silent accumulation and encroachments by Ecclesiastical Bodies has not sufficiently engaged attention in the U.S."[8]

In the course of his discussion, Madison asks whether the appointment of chaplains to the two Houses of Congress is "consistent with the Constitution, and with the pure principle of religious freedom." Both parts of this question he answers in the negative. The appointment of chaplains violates the Constitution, because it "establishes a religious worship for the national representatives, to be performed by ministers of religion, elected by a majority of them; and these are to be paid out of the national taxes." This contravenes the constitutional provisions against a national establishment. The appointment of chaplains is also inconsistent with the principle of religious freedom; it is "a palpable violation of equal rights," because "the tenets of the Chaplain elected shut the door of worship against the members whose creeds and consciences forbid a participation in that of the majority."[9]

But it was not only in the Federal government that chaplaincies were introduced at this time; the question arose in some of the state governments as well. It was agitated with special fervor in the State of New York, to which we now turn our attention.

II

In 1777, when the first constitution of the State of New York was drawn up, its thirty-eighth article ordained "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference."[10] At the same time, in the thirty-fifth article, any previous colonial laws establishing or maintaining "any particular denomina-

8. Quoted in Blakely, *American State Papers*, p. 164.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

10. The full text of this article is worth quoting, since it is no longer as well known as in the early days of our Republic. "Whereas we are required by the benevolent principles of rational liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to guard against that spiritual oppression and intolerance wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked priests and princes have scourged mankind: this convention doth further, in the name of the good people of this State, ordain, determine and declare, that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all mankind: *Provided*, that the liberty of conscience hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of this State."

tion of christians or their ministers . . . are hereby abrogated and rejected." In the first constitution, and in the constitution of 1821, ministers of the gospel or priests of any denomination were declared ineligible for "any civil or military office or place within this state."[11] Clearly the first of these articles is designed to protect the religion of the individual against infringement by the state; the second is as clearly designed to protect the state against domination by the clergy, i.e., against the abuses of religious organization. Were these two complementary intentions carried out, there would be no issue of religious freedom today: to protect religion from the state, and the state from the church.

For several years after 1777 these provisions were adhered to, and no legislative chaplains appointed. Gradually, however, the literal prescription was violated and chaplains of both houses appointed by independent resolutions. In the year 1829, when Revised Statutes were issued, the pay of legislative chaplains was provided for by law, and thus the constitutional prohibition was abrogated.[12] As soon as news of this change in the fundamental law of the state was widely circulated, the Legislature received petitions, memorials, and remonstrances from groups of citizens all over the State.[13] We do not have the text of these petitions; from the bare record in the Journal of the Assembly or Senate it is impossible to tell whether the objection was to *having* legislative chaplains or to *paying* legislative chaplains. It is clear that there was some objection, and that it was widespread.

11. Again, the wording is interesting: "Whereas the ministers of the gospel, are, by their profession, dedicated to the service of God, and the cure of souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions; therefore, no minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever shall at any time hereafter, under any pretence or description whatever, be eligible to, or capable of holding, any civil or military office or place within this state." Constitution of 1821, Art. VII, sec. 4. See Pardon Davis, *The Principles of the Government of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1823), p. 60.

12. Revised Statutes, pt. 1, sec. VII, ch. 7, tit. vi.

13. In 1832, for example, some twenty-six petitions were received by the Assembly; in 1833, on four days at the opening of the session (January 2, 3, 4, and 5), no less than twenty-two memorials came to the Assembly, and others to the Senate. Among the counties from which such protests were sent were: Dutchess, Tompkins, New York, Onondaga, Greene, Allegany, Orange, Genesee, Albany, Columbia. The full list is not recoverable, because in many cases the clerk of the Assembly recorded in this fashion, "Ten several memorials of sundry inhabitants of this state. . . ."

In 1832, at the opening session of the Assembly, the usual resolution was proposed: That the clerk of the House request the several clergymen of Albany having charge of congregations to attend the House each morning to open its deliberations by prayer. The resolution was tabled. When it was considered, in the second day of the session (January 4, 1832), Assemblyman David Moulton of Oneida County moved an amendment that required the clergymen to serve without compensation. This amendment was defeated, 85 to 36. John C. Kemble, of Rensselaer County, then moved to amend by providing for assessment of the members of the House to pay for the praying; this amendment was defeated by an even greater margin, 96 to 28. Then the original resolution was passed, without a recorded vote. Thus it appeared that a majority of the members of the Assembly were willing to open with prayer provided the people of the State paid the costs. It is recorded, however, that many of the gentlemen did not attend the prayers, and that, on one occasion, there was no quorum present in the hall of meeting, though the assemblymen were in the building; the Speaker was compelled to adjourn for lack of a quorum. A few minutes later, having allowed time for the prayers to be completed, the assemblymen drifted into the meeting-hall.[14]

Moulton and Kemble, who appeared briefly a moment ago as proposers of tongue-in-cheek amendments to the resolution to appoint chaplains, together with Mordecai Myers of New York, were named as a "select committee" to consider the various petitions and to bring in a report on the question of legislative chaplaincies. Their report was presented on April 16, 1832 and is a good statement of the arguments of those opposed to legislative chaplaincies. The resolutions which they presented were, however, tabled and never acted upon.

A year later, in the 1833 session, the resolution to appoint chaplains was presented on the first day (January 1, 1833) and tabled. On January 3, when it was again brought up for consideration, Dudley Burwell, assemblyman from Herkimer County moved that this resolution should be referred to the "Select committee to which was referred sundry memorials for a repeal of the law compensating legislative chap-

14. See *Documents of the Assembly of the State of New York, Fifty-fifth Session,* 1832 (Albany, 1832), vol. IV, doc. 298, p. 7. "During prayer time, there is seldom more than a lean quorum in attendance, and often less."

lains."[15] The select committee of 1833 was composed of Thomas Herttell of New York, a free thought leader, Ichabod C. Baker, of Oneida County, an opponent of the chaplaincies, and Charles Rogers, of Washington County, who favored legislative prayer. This motion would have been tantamount to killing the resolution by deferring action as the entire House had deferred action on the Moulton-Myers report at the previous session. Mr. Burwell's motion came near to passage; it was defeated by a vote of 67 to 54. Thereupon Isaac Van Duzer of Orange county proposed an amendment to the original resolution, "that the members of this House contribute and pay for such services, such sum or compensation as they may see fit."[16] Needless to say, this was defeated by a larger margin, 71 to 50. Finally, the original resolution was brought to a vote and passed by a vote of 80 to 40.

Whatever satisfaction this might have brought to the advocates of legislative prayer was quickly turned to mortification when a large group of Albany's clergymen declined the invitation to pray for and at the legislators. After acknowledging the invitation received from both Senate and Assembly, their letter reads:

> The undersigned have carefully considered the subject connected with this invitation and in view of the opposition which the employment of chaplains by the Legislature has met with within a few years past; the unpleasant discussion which it has occasioned, and which will probably be renewed from year to year; they believe *they* will best subserve the interests of religion by respectfully declining the invitation of the Honorable the Senate and Assembly.[17]

One further external detail remains to be noted. On January 7, 1833, Mr. Dudley Burwell, of Herkimer County, introduced a bill repealing that section of the Revised Statutes which provided for the payment of legislative chaplains. The bill was passed by an overwhelming majority (110 to 9) on January 8, and presented to the Senate for concurrence. The Senate received the bill on January 9, referred it to the judiciary committee, who discharged it on January 17, and committed to the

15. *Journal of the Assembly of the State of New-York, at their fifty-sixth session . . .* (Albany, 1833), p. 85.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 99, italics in the original. The signers were Frederick G. Mayer, John Ludlow, Charles Smith, B. F. Welch, James R. Willson, E. N. Kirk, William Lochead, W. Linn Keese, J. W. Campbell, James Martin, Isaac D. Williamson, Isaac Ferris, and W. B. Sprague.

committee of the whole. Here it was not brought up for action until March 25, when it was passed 18 to 11. Thus a typical legislative compromise was effected; the principle of legislative chaplaincies was not determined, but an important area of contention, the statutory provision for payment of chaplains, was eliminated.[18]

III

Unfortunately, the *Journals* of the Senate and Assembly of the State of New York for this period do not record the text of speeches made on proposed resolutions or motions. There are, therefore, only a few documents to which we can refer for the arguments on this question. There is the Moulton-Myers report to which reference has already been made and a speech by Thomas Herttell, preserved in the work of an opponent. These represent the anti-chaplaincy position. To represent the pro-chaplaincy case, there is a book, *A Layman's Apology for the Appointment of Clerical Chaplains by the Legislature of the State of New-York,* published by Solomon Southwick under the pseudonym of "Sherlock."[19] Southwick's book is an attack on Herttell, and quotes his speech in full, and also reproduces a brief speech by Assemblyman Charles Rogers, "the only speech, I believe, on that side of the question,"[20] but one which "though it did honor to his head and heart, did not meet the question as it ought to have been met in its full extent."[21] Thus, for each side, there is one longer, prepared statement, and one shorter speech, presented during legislative argument on the question.

The Moulton-Myers report begins by denying the value of an examination of the history of legislative prayer outside of the United States.

> The "march of mind" must have progressed to a very limited extent and to very little useful purpose; if the civil and religious liberties of the people of this

18. *Ibid.,* pp. 104, 105, 110, 111; *Journal of the Senate of the State of New-York at their fifty-sixth session. . . .* (Albany, 1833), pp. 82, 94, 261-62; *Documents of the Senate of the State of New-York, Fifty-sixth Session,* 1833 (Albany, 1833), vol. 1, doc. 28.

19. Albany, Hoffman and White, 1834. The letters which compose the major portion of the book were originally published in the *Washington County Post,* Salem, N. Y. in 1833. Three supplementary letters were published in the *Albany Daily Advertiser* in 1834.

20. *A Layman's Apology,* p. 202.

21. *Ibid.,* p. xxvi.

country were to be ascertained and measured by the opinions and customs of mankind in remote ages and in other nations, and under governments as dissimilar in their principles and character to those of our own country, as they were incompatible with the equal rights of man.[22]

The only things certainly known from history are that no nation subject to "a union of political and ecclesiastical powers" was ever free nor its people able to "escape being depraved and miserable," that there had never been a political despotism sustained without clerical support, and that no religion could remain undefiled when perverted to political purposes. Such results must be expected "from the combined operation of church and state machinery." This will generally be the case when political power is placed in the hands of men who consider themselves "to be elected ministers of a power above the people, and to possess authority 'beyond the civil law.' " Such men tend to regard their own "will and opinions" as the "will and word" of God. Further, since the promotion of their own particular denomination is their "interest and business calling," they have always tended to subordinate their duty to the community to their duty to their own creed "and have always exercised their political power to sustain their own particular *church* and *faith,* to the detriment and exclusion of all others." Reasons such as these, "attested by historic evidence," lie behind the American rejection of any union of church and state.[23]

The writers then reviewed the provisions of the constitution of New York State and the practice, "never authorized by any provision of the constitution," of inviting chaplains to pray before the sessions of both houses of the Legislature. They refer to the Revised Statutes of 1829, in which provision was made for the payment of chaplains for this service, and "priests thus recognized as *if* they were legitimate and necessary appurtenances to the legislative department of the State." This history is cited as "another illustration of the truth, that the least participation of clerical with civil authority, is dangerous to the liberties of the people." They maintain that, through the breach thus made, "the existence and continuance of several other laws on

22. *Documents of the Assembly of the State of New-York, Fifty-fifth Session,* 1832 (Albany, 1832), vol. IV, doc. 298, p. 2. The full text of the Moulton-Myers report is now available in my *Cornerstones of Religious Freedom in America,* pp. 141-56.

23. *Ibid.,* pp. 2-3.

our statute books, which actually trench on religious liberty" are to be accounted for, and the contravention of the constitutional provisions explained.[24]

Following the general preface, Moulton and Myers proceed to the establishment of their special point:

> That the Legislature possess no legitimate authority to associate religious prayers with legislative proceedings, nor to appoint legislative chaplains, nor, to appropriate the public money to pay for any religious service: and because,
> 1st. No such authority has been delegated to them: and
> 2d. Because the exercise of such powers is not only repugnant to the constitution, but expressly interdicted by it.[25]

The Legislature is clearly vested with civil power alone; the only character which has been claimed for prayer is that of a religious duty. "Religion," they quote, probably from one of the memorials, "is a concern between man's conscience and his God, with which no human tribunal has a right to meddle." A civil legislature has no authority to perform an act of religious devotion officially, nor to require others to do so, nor to attend its performance. "The people have not delegated power to the Legislature to perform religious worship of any kind; and if prayers are acts of ecclesiastical character and of religious duty, legislative prayers are acts of supererogation."[26]

Furthermore, prayer often "operates unpropitiously to the public interest," by interfering with the proper business of the Legislature. This is the result of the fact that only a few of the legislators can at any one time join sincerely in the service. Some "conscientiously disapprove of prayers altogether; others are averse to *legislative* prayers; others again do not hold to prayers in *public places*." In addition to this variety of opinion on the specific question of prayer, there is the more general point that in the legislative assembly there are "persons of various religious sects and adverse religious opinions, and who are elected without reference to their religious creeds." This creates difficulty and disharmony and interferes with the business of the legislature, because "mankind are generally averse to associate in religious devotion with any but those whose feelings and faith accord with their own"; while they may occasionally be induced to listen re-

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-6
25. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
26. *Ibid.*

spectfully to a "sincere supplicant," as legislators, compelled to listen frequently, they become "annoyed by the repeated annunciation of sentiments out of harmony with their own." They find their courtesy "greatly over taxed," their feelings "disobliged," their convictions "counteracted"; in the end they "usually absent themselves from the legislative chambers until after the ecclesiastical business of the house shall have been concluded."[27]

Now, if the Legislature is not empowered to conduct religious exercises or to "attempt, by official vote, to constrain the minority, against their religious opinions," Moulton and Myers maintain, "it is a self-evident and incontrovertible principle" that they have no right to empower others to do so. It is an assumed power, "dependent alone on the legislative will," and therefore can be used as precedent for any further extension of power "under religious and moral pretences."[28] This is, it seems to me, the crux of the argument in this report and the heart of the case against legislative chaplaincies.

> If the right of the Legislature to appoint chaplains to *pray* were to be admitted, the right to employ them to *preach* and *sing psalms* could not be denied. *All* are religious *services,* and are deemed by many to be religious *duties.* By the like assumed authority by which the Legislature employ chaplains to *pray* at *one* time, they could employ them to do the like, or any other religious *service,* at any *other time;* on *Sunday* as well as on any *other day;* and at *one* place as well as *another.* If *in* the halls of legislation, why not *out* of them? If in the form of prayer, why not in any other manner? What then could prevent their assuming authority to direct and regulate religious worship throughout the State?[29]

A similar, but far weaker argument is used to suggest that, if the power to appoint legislative chaplains be assumed, the power to create other ecclesiastical officers could follow.

The Legislature cannot appoint members of the clergy to civil office; this is expressly interdicted by the state constitution. No more can the Legislature, whose authority is exclusively civil, appoint members of the clergy to ecclesiastical office. They may not, therefore, provide from the public treasury for the pay of those whom they have no right to appoint, "or for services which they have no better authority offi-

27. *Ibid.,* pp. 6-7.
28. *Ibid.,* pp. 7-8.
29. *Ibid.,* p. 8.

cially to require," better, that is, than the assumed power of the Legislature itself. If chaplains are used, they ought in justice to be paid, "not from the public purse, nor from the pockets of individuals who neither require nor approve *public* prayers, nor any *hired* religious devotion," but by those who require and use their services. It would not be contended that the Legislature has the right to levy a direct tax on the people to pay for such services; how, then, has it the right to take money which has been raised for legitimate objects and thus misapply it?[30]

This discussion ends the specific argument relating to legislative chaplaincies. Moulton and Myers took the opportunity to place on the record their comment on the contention "that the United States are a nation of christians; that christianity is the law of the land, and that all are infidels who disbelieve this doctrine or oppose it."[31] They admit that a majority of the people are "professing christians," but maintain that there is some doubt "which particular *creed,* of the seventy different christian sects, is to be respected as the law of the land, and by which the other sixty-nine would be held as illegal."[32] However, despite the numerical predominance of Christians, Moulton and Myers deny that "christianity as such is the law of the land." It is the constitution, they argue, which is "supreme." By the constitution all religions—"the *mosque,* the *synagogue,* the *christian* church, and all other churches"—are declared to stand on an equal footing. Therefore, say they, it is explicit in the supreme law of the land that "no religious creed, as such, can be recognized as the law of the State" and that, therefore, the whole question of appointment and payment of legislative chaplains is an unauthorized extension of the constitution. Whatever statutes allow legislative chaplaincies are unconstitutional and should be repealed.[33] To this end a bill had been introduced, in

30. *Ibid.,* pp. 10-11.

31. This form of expression was very widespread in the period under discussion, as indeed it is with probably more warrant today. A typical supporting argument can be found in J. Adams, *The Relation of Christianity to Civil Government in the United States* (Charleston, S. C., 1833), pp. 11-14; 31-32.

32. *Documents of the Assembly of the State of New-York, Fifty-fifth Session, 1832* (Albany, 1832), vol. IV, doc. 298, p. 12.

33. *Ibid.,* pp. 13-15.

supplement to which they presented the following resolutions, action on which, as was noted earlier, was tabled:

Resolved, That all legislation on religion, other than pursuant to the constitution, to secure to "all mankind within this State without discrimination or preference" the free and unmolested enjoyment of the rights of opinion and free discussion, is unjust, unauthorized and unconstitutional.

Resolved, That all existing laws by which any person within this State is coerced against his conscientious opinions to conform to the religious creeds or doctrines of others, are unjust, unconstitutional, nugatory, and ought to be repealed.

Mr. Herttell's brief speech of January 2, 1833 on the resolution for the appointment of chaplains does not talk to the narrow issue, but concerns itself, rather, with a statement of his beliefs, in reply to the general designation of those opposing chaplaincies as "infidels," unbelievers. He points out that infidel is a relative term; that from the standpoint of any one Christian sect not merely all non-Christians, but also all other Christians are unbelievers. "Have not each been constantly denounced by all others as *unbelievers* in the *true* Christian doctrines?"[34] He admits that "if voting against the resolution now before the house constitutes *infidelity,* then am I an *infidel.*"[35] However, he maintains that he has a creed which, whether it be called religious faith or infidelity, "is the logical and moral creed of those who are in principle and in practice, as well as in profession, opposed to a union of church and state."[36]

Herttell's beliefs are: that since God is omniscient, it is unnecessary to make confession of faith to God; no more is it necessary to make confession to any man "because it is no concern of his." Prayer in any of its forms he sees as presumptuous. "I never offer aid to *almighty power,* nor presume to counsel *infinite wisdom*; I never supplicate *infinite love* to be more kind, nor desire to avert the judgments of *immaculate justice.*"[37] For the rest, his positive beliefs are political; they are affirmations of the religious freedom of the individual. Of these, this is the one which provides the chief basis for opposing the institution of legislative chaplaincies:

34. *A Layman's Apology* (Albany, 1834), p. 207.
35. *Ibid.,* p. 205.
36. *Ibid.,* p. 209.
37. *Ibid.,* p. 208.

Any official act, either of the executive, legislative, or judiciary departments of the government, enforcing, favoring, or aiding, the operation of any religious sectarian doctrine, dogma, or duty, or which shall be intended directly or indirectly to effect such purpose, *is, in fact, a union of church and state powers*—an act of spiritual intolerance and oppression—a violation of the provisions of the constitution, and is, therefore, an unrighteous stretch of human power, which exhibits the mischievous effects, the error, and the *human origin*, of any system of religion which stands in need of being bolstered up by acts of political usurpation.[38]

Herttell also states his unbeliefs; some of them might well be taken to heart today by over-aggressive exponents of the right of religious organizations to stand above the law.

I cannot be induced to believe that to be a good religion for society, which excites a disposition in its advocates to trench on the equal rights of other men—nor that religion useful, which cannot restrain its professors from such a course of conduct—nor that religion harmless, which destroys "good will" and creates hostility among mankind—nor that religion just, which destroys the balance of equal rights. . . .[39]

Out of this "creed" Herttell concludes he has no religion which can "accommodate itself to such an inconsistency" as the appointment of chaplains "by dozens" under the authority of a constitution which contains a specific interdiction of the appointment of members of the clergy to a civil position, and a denial to the Legislature of the power to make any but civil appointments.

Charles Rogers, of Washington County, spoke for the employment of legislative chaplains. He did so because "it does not become a moral and religious people, to declare themselves independent of a Superintending Providence." It is perfectly true, he admits, that the appointment of chaplains is not specifically allowed in the Constitution; but "we do many things without an express grant of power." A constitution cannot include every particular; some things "are not given us by express grant, but by necessary implication." The "constitutional doubts and misgivings" of opponents of chaplaincies are "directed against the ministers of the living God." This seemed to Rogers "altogether indefensible." He next used the argument from the constitutional convention, a favorite with the pro-chaplaincy men:

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 208-9.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

In forming the constitution of the United States, when beset with overwhelming difficulties from which there appeared no relief, Dr. Franklin proposed, that their sittings should in future be opened with prayer; which met with the approbation of the Convention, and particularly the President, General Washington, and which was immediately adopted and ever afterwards continued.[40]

He does not think that there is danger of a union of church and state; the danger is, rather, the opposite one of "falling into the cold embrace of Infidelity." The French Revolution teaches what happens to a country dominated by infidels; remember that the opposition to the resolution for appointment of chaplains then under consideration "is but one of the many attempts to discredit religion, and throw opprobrium on her votaries, for the purpose of substituting the reign of Reason and Philosophy! . . . Let us rebuke this effort against the religion of our fathers," by passing the resolution and appointing chaplains paid out of public funds.

I shall not give as thorough a summary of Southwick's book as I have of these shorter pieces. I exclude, therefore, with regret the pious author's scurrilous attack on Mordecai Myers for having been born a Jew; his offensive casting of the fawning speech that he thinks Myers *should* have made, if Myers had been properly sensible of his obligations of gratitude to the Christian state that tolerated him; Southwick's characterization of a whole country of upper New York State folk as a horse-racing and gambling population; and other such choice tidbits of Christian humility and meekness. Instead of these, I present his reply on the question of constitutionality, in which he hopes to "prove to the satisfaction of every unbiassed mind, that it is binding on the House as a constitutional, moral, and religious duty" to appoint chaplains. This Southwick achieves by asserting that it is "a universal law, whether derived from God himself . . . or the nature and fitness of things, that man should do homage to his real or supposed Creator." These universal laws are superior to man-made laws; "if man, individually is bound by them to do homage to that Eternal Being, it follows that Society is bound to do the same homage." If these first principles be granted, there is no difficulty whatever in showing that legislative prayer, however it be or be not treated in the

40. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

Constitution of the State of New York, is enjoined upon Legislatures by "most sacred and inviolable" laws.

> By that Constitution or Law of Heaven, which is binding upon all men, and all nations, and which indeed all the wisest men and most enlightened and civilized nations, bow to as of divine origin, and eternal and unlimited operation; the Legislature are bound to commence their daily sittings with prayer to Almighty God.

Who is to do this praying? It might be done by the Speaker of the Assembly and the President of the Senate, or by any member of either body. But why not appoint those specifically qualified, members of the clergy? The Constitution of the State forbids it. "That little twinkling star of the lowest atmosphere—that mere *ignis fatuus* of authority when compared with the Supreme Constitution of Heaven."[41]

This, I think, is sufficient to indicate the quality of Southwick's reasoning and the character of his argument. It is also, I think, clear that neither party really has an argument worthy of the name. These are all statements of conviction, confessions of faith, rather than persuasive or convincing pieces of reasoning. I cannot see any one of these four preachings appealing to any except the already converted.

IV

The question of freedom of prayer which I have illustrated in this controversy of a century past would have seemed to me trivial and academic a couple of months ago. We have long since stopped questioning the constitutionality of legislative chaplaincies, recognizing that this is one case where it is easier to let the issue slide, and the prayers become, as they have, a mere external formality, having no more meaning to the members of Congress than has the use of the Bible for swearing to perjury in the courtroom. We do not take these legislative prayers even as seriously as did Mr. Dooley, whose well-remembered comment is, "The ministher looked at the Senators, and prayed for the People." The legislative prayer has become less a politic request to God for His needed guidance, and more a political gesture toward constituents who still measure piety in forms rather than in reforms.

But the issue is not being allowed to slumber in the peace it so de-

41. *Ibid.*, Letter VI. pp. 95-105.

serves. It is being agitated over again in a new context in which it can do much harm. On December 16, 1947, just a short time ago, there appeared in the Congressional Record[42] a speech by Congressman Edward H. Rees, of Kansas, purporting, in its opening paragraph, to be "on a matter that deeply concerns the world, . . . the success of the United Nations." Mr. Rees is really concerned with "the fact that prayer for the guidance of God does not appear on the agenda of the United Nations." His attention was called to this question by an editorial of the Lutheran minister, Dr. Oscar F. Blackwelder, of the Church of the Reformation in Washington, D. C. In this editorial Dr. Blackwelder refers to a correspondence between a Washington businessman, W. M. Ritter, and the President and the State Department. Mr. Ritter had apparently urged the President and officials of the State Department to press for the addition of prayer to the agenda of United Nations meetings.

The reply from the State Department adverted to the Constitution of the United States and its guarantee of separation of church and state, and to the United Nations Charter which "emphasized tolerance and respect for 'fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,'" and also points to the great difficulty which would arise "in attempting to arrange for any international gathering a religious observance which would be acceptable to the many different religious faiths and philosophies of the participating delegates."

To the State Department's reference to the Constitution of the United States, Mr. Rees replied by telling very dramatically the story of the Franklin motion for prayer at the Constitutional Convention. He says "The motion carried . . . differences were composed, and in a comparatively few days the Constitution was adopted. The remainder is a matter of history." I have no great desire to appear in the role of a debunker, especially of so pretty and useful a fable as this; since, however, the same argument, the same appeal to the founding fathers, is repeated whenever this question of legislative prayer arises, I must say that there is no truth in the story, beyond the fact that Franklin made what appears from the record to have been a well-thought out statement to the effect that nothing else seems to have worked; why

42. 93 *Congressional Record,* 11613-14.

not try prayer?[43] Alexander Hamilton (who has since become the greatest democrat, I suppose because he was the first of a long line of shoddy demagogues to attempt the injection of religious issues into American politics)[44] flipped off the casual wisecrack, "We have no need of foreign aid." This, for the benefit of Congressman Rees, is "a matter of history." He may, if he prefers, go on believing in the myths of Parson Weems.

Rees deals with the point concerning the United Nations Charter by asserting that "Race is certainly respected at U. N. Sessions. Both sexes are heard. All languages are translated. Why must the fourth freedom alone, that of religion be silent?" He suggests that "the omission of prayer from the U. N. agenda [is] freedom from religion rather than freedom for religion." Finally, he thinks that the difficulties cited by the State Department could be eliminated if the typical American compromise were to be adopted. "Why could not all of the various viewpoints and practices of religion, represented in the U. N. be given a chance to lead in prayer in their several individual ways?"

In conclusion, Mr. Rees spreads on the record his belief that "a world of justice, freedom, and peace will never be built by people whose intellectual ceilings are so low that a public prayer for the guidance of God is an offense."

V

The issue of legislative prayer having been thus raised on a global scale and tied to the quest for justice, freedom, and peace, I am sure we have not heard the last of it. Mr. Ritter, Dr. Blackwelder, and Congressman Rees have but shown the way; in a few months prayer on the U. N. agenda will become a crusade. And it is not an issue which can be blinked aside. Certainly, if the U. N. is to succeed, some way must be found to sanctify its work. I just wonder whether the sort of thing that we have developed in our own legislative assemblies, routine formalities of prayer taken seriously by no one, is the solution; or, for the matter of that, whether such a solution is at all possible in the U. N., which, unlike the U. S. A., contains groups outside the

43. Cf. Carl Van Doren, *The Great Rehearsal* (New York, 1948), pp. 100-02.

44. Cf. the shocking treatment by Moorhouse F. X. Millar in "The Founding Fathers," *Foundations of Democracy* (New York, 1947).

Hebrew-Christian tradition. In raising the issue here, I should like to suggest briefly a few possible directions of approach.

First, let me say that a formalistic determination of the whole question on the ground of moral right cannot be made. Both sides have a clear and valid appeal to fundamental rights derived from the concept of freedom of religion. The statement of Laurens Perseus Hickok can hardly be gainsaid: "The state must protect every man in his religion or his irreligion."[45] Both freedom of worship and freedom from worship are implied in freedom of religion. Yet the guarantee of freedom of worship implicitly guarantees the opportunity to worship, to pray, at all times and in all places regarded as consecrated; the guarantee of freedom from worship, while it does not and should not forbid prayer for those who wish it, does imply that prayer shall not be forced on those who do not wish it.[46] In a legislative body whose members and constituents include both believers and non-believers in prayer, any decision is bound to be an offense to one group or the other. Whichever course is pursued is bound to trample on the conscientious rights of those who uphold the alternative. On formalistic grounds the question is insoluble.

A utilitarian solution is equally impossible, for who can tell whether, if prayer be offered, the joy of the believer will more or less than counter-balance the discomfort of the unbeliever, or, if prayer be omitted, whether the satisfaction of the secularist will be more or less than the pain of the prayerful. A house to house canvass to determine the views of the constituents is a manifest impossibility even in the United States; and I doubt whether one could find many who would be willing to accept the verdict of the Decennial Census of Religious Bodies as the determinant of policy for the succeeding decade: prayer to be allowed when the census showed a majority of the population as members of religious groups, and to be disallowed when the reverse was true. The results of this census are inaccurate enough now, when nothing depends upon it; how much less trustworthy it would be if legislative prayer hinged upon it is impossible to predict. All one can say with assurance is that it would not become more

45. Hickok (Vice President of Union College), *A System of Moral Science* (Schenectady, 1853), p. 244.

46. This, of course, is the dilemma faced by those who feel that prayer or religious education is appropriate in the public schools.

reliable. Thus the resort to majority decision seems unlikely to produce any decisive answer to the problem.

There seems, on the surface, to be a common-sense compromise available. Perhaps if we provided a chapel in each building where a U. N. or U.S. legislative assembly sits, those who want to commune with God before each session, or, for that matter, before each vote, might be allowed to adjourn to the chapel, while those whose ears would be offended by prayer adjourned to the smoking room. After all, we do provide a restaurant for those legislators who wish to eat and a library for those who need to consult reference books. We do not enforce eating on those who wish to diet or reading on those who come from Mississippi. Why can not such an arrangement be made for the soul as well as for the body and the mind? Alas, no! For the cases are not parallel. The legislator who desires food wants it to satisfy his own hunger; the legislator who needs a book requires it to bolster his own speech; but the legislator who wants prayer wants it not for himself and the other members of his own party; it is not they who need prayer to bring them into the proper frame of mind. He wants it, rather, for his opponents; they are the ones who need to be brought to a proper view of their responsibilities. If they had such a view, they could scarcely be his opponents. This is not an issue which yields to compromise.

I hesitate to suggest that there may be an empirical solution to our problem, but I do think that such a solution is within the bounds of possibility. Perhaps the suggestion, if it has merit, will appeal to historians. It seems to me that, from the point of view of society, the significant question is not whether certain legislators want prayers, or why they want prayers, or whether their constituents want legislative prayer, or do not want prayer but think their representatives need prayer. The significant question is: Since the function of the legislature within society is to make laws, does prayer help to make better laws? To resolve this question, there would have to be comparative studies of praying and non-praying legislative bodies throughout history; if the studies showed that better law came from praying bodies than from non-praying bodies, then until further study overthrew this result, we should accept its verdict and insist that our legislatures open with prayer; if the studies showed the contrary, we should con-

sider anyone suggesting prayer at U. N. sessions as making a deliberate attempt to sabotage world peace by adding yet another bone of contention to the many already troubling the world and its U. N. Such a method might produce a little light.

Finally, I would suggest that, if we could find some way to express in ritual the ideals for which the United Nations body was formed, we might come far closer to resolving the issue than in any other way. There are spiritual aspirations which all humankind holds dear. These values have their natural home in the U. N. Could we but have the inspiration to create about these values a ceremonial which would be neither Christian nor Mohammedan nor Jewish nor Buddhist, nor of any other sect or segment of humanity, this ceremonial of world unity, participated in by all at every session of the United Nations could do more for world peace and human integrity than the divisive forces of organized religion have been able to do in their thousands of years of effort. This perhaps is a dream; but it is the only dream which foreshadows the breaking of day.

COMMUNICATIONS

ERANOS 1949

VIOLET DE LASZLO, M.D.

EVERY AUGUST SINCE 1933, men and women have traveled from many countries to the village of Ascona, at the southern foot of the Swiss Alps. There, in a lecture hall built for the purpose on the shore of Lake Maggiore, to the accompaniment of lapping waves and rustling leaves, against a background of mountainside and sky, a group has assembled whose interests have been focussed upon spiritual and psychological problems of general human significance. Though the membership has varied from year to year, a remarkable continuity of thought has been maintained. This has been accomplished through the efforts of Frau Olga Fröbe-Kapteyn, founder and organizer of the Eranos conferences. She has succeeded in obtaining the co-operation of noted scholars from the fields of anthropology, psychology, mythology, religion, and the natural sciences, as well as that of an audience whose sustained interest has furnished a stimulating resonance.

Since this continuity is one of the most valuable assets of the meetings, a brief survey of their main themes seems indicated. These have been selected with a view to increasing the knowledge of the basic nature of man in all regions of the globe. Thus, in the course of the first three years, certain religious-psychological tenets of Eastern and Western cultures were investigated and compared, particularly in respect to the problem of guidance of the soul (*Seelenführung*). The titles of the papers may serve to illustrate the nature of this attempt: "Religious Practices in India and Religious Man," by Mrs. Rhys Davids; "The Conduct of the Soul in Contemporary Taoism," by Dr. Erwin Rousselle; "The Significance of Tantra Yoga," by Professor Heinrich Zimmer; "Meditation and Contemplation in the Roman Catholic Church," by Professor Ernesto Buonaiuti; "The Empiricism of the Individuation Process," by Dr. C. G. Jung; and "Symbolic and Sacramental Living in Judaism," by Professor Martin Buber.

The choice of speakers and subjects makes it evident that emphasis has been placed on the exploration of the correlation between religion and depth psychology. This search was continued during the two fol-

lowing summers, under the general heading, "Formulation of the Idea of Redemption in East and West," and, in 1939, "Symbolism of Rebirth in Religious Representations through the Ages." The first two sessions during the war were devoted to the themes, "The Trinity, Christian Symbolism, and the Gnosis," and "The Hermetic Principle in Mythology, Gnosticism, and Alchemy." In 1943, the lectures were concerned with ancient solar cults, and the symbolism of light in Gnosticism and early Christianity as expressions of man's longing for illumination or, psychologically speaking, for a deeper awareness.

In 1944, the mysteries in the religious traditions of Greece, Egypt, Iran, and in Gnosticism, early Christianity, and Islam were discussed. These papers provided the basis for a further extensive study of irrational cultic manifestations in religious experience. The post-war period, finally, was ushered in with a symposium on "The Spirit," and continued with a series of studies on the concept of man, with special attention, in 1949, to the subject, "Man and the Mythical World."

The contributions presented each year have been made available to the general public in the *Eranos Jahrbuch,* an American edition of which is now in preparation. It seems fitting that, in 1945, there appeared an extra volume of papers in honor of C. G. Jung's seventieth birthday, devoted to the problem of the Archetypes. For Dr. Jung has been among the most constant contributors to Eranos, and his active participation has provided a substantial part of the leaven and the cohesive force which have shaped the course of the conferences.

The first paper of Eranos 1949 was presented by Professor G. van der Leeuw, of Groningen, which, by the broad sweep of its vision, provided a framework for the conference. Its title, "Urzeit und Endzeit," had best be translated, perhaps, as "Initial Time and Terminal Time," or as "Arch-time and End-time." The author makes a distinction between this initial time and antiquity, which latter is related by history to the present day, whereas this arch-time exists, as it were, always and never. It is the stratum of human experience above and below history, the abode of the myth. Such an event as the biblical expulsion from paradise is not historical; it is ever present and is repeated indefinitely. In another sense, however, this arch-time belongs to history, in that it is comprehended within the ubiquitous myth of the end-time in which man expects the fulfillment of time

itself, and, accordingly, also the fulfillment of the mythical world operative in mythical time. End-time, therefore, may be regarded as a dimension of human experience at the mythical level.

Professor Karl Kerényi's paper introduced his hearers into the realm of Orphic cosmogony. According to his definition, mythology is concerned not with the question "Why?" (aetiology), but "Whence?"—the beginnings (*archai*). It is neither an exact nor a speculative science, but a specific kind of narration in a cultic situation, somewhat analogous to music and painting. The myth of Hippolytus, who serves Artemis, represents an epoch preceding that of the cult of Demeter, an agricultural deity—an epoch in which the hunter is in a naturally hallowed state, characterized by a strangely ambivalent relationship to the flesh of his quarry. The cult expressing this inner psychological relation is Orphism, in which the adept identifies himself with the animal (as evidenced by representations part animal and part human), and has the attributes of the hunter (e.g., on Cretan sarcophagi). The initiator into the mysteries is Orpheus, the embodiment of the initiator archetype, and his adepts embody the archetype of the youth, the hunter.

Professor E. O. James, of London, presented a paper on "Myth and Ritual," a study of the death and rebirth culture pattern in relation to the individual and the sacred community, which provided a startling contrast to the preceding paper. While Kerényi penetrated his material in a manner analogous to the hunter-adept entering into the very skin of his animal-victim, and seemed to express it from within by an intuitive-feeling process, James approached his material in the manner of an observer. Remaining wholly outside the observed phenomena, he defined myth and ritual in the positivist tradition as symbolic tale and action, as techniques for making accessible superhuman potencies and for assimilating life-giving energies, or, in other words, as manifestations, in both life and death, of human as well as superhuman libido.

The group of anthropological studies was completed by Professor Paul Radin, of Berkeley, and Professor A. E. Jensen, of Frankfurt, representing American and German schools of ethnology. Professor Radin's paper, "The Basic Myth of the North American Indian," presented thoughtfully related material, collected through half a lifetime

of painstaking field work. Its theme was the conviction of the North American Indian that, though man has no intrinsic right to existence, nevertheless, once born, he can claim the right to subsistence, as well as the right of self-expression. Professor Jensen's paper, "Urzeitmythen alter Pflanzenvölker" (Primitive Myths of Ancient Planter Peoples), revealed the striking difference between the thought-forms of a pupil of Frobenius and the American school of anthropology. Both studies, as well as that of Professor Julius Baum, of Stuttgart, on "Mythological Representations in Scandinavian Art," were richly documented.

A further group of lectures dealt with the role of myth in non-primitive religions. The first of these was a paper by the French Orientalist, Henry Corbin, of Teheran, on "The Tale of Initiation, and Hermetism in Iran." It began with the reading of an unpublished manuscript of the thirteenth century Persian mystic, Sohrawardi—a subtle composition emanating from heretical Persian Muhammedanism. Professor Corbin interpreted this as the recital of an inner psychic process, or progress of initiation and purification, into which are woven Islamic, alchemistic, astrological, and fairy-tale elements. He gratefully acknowledged his indebtedness to Jung's research in the symbolism of individuation for providing the clue to his interpretation of this text, thus tacitly confirming Kenrényi's conception of mysticism as the individual religious enterprise. In a parallel attempt to that of Corbin, Professor G. G. Scholem, of Jerusalem, revived for his hearers the impressive symbolism of Jewish mysticism, which reflects the efforts of the Kabbalists to express the intensity of their experience of God.

It would be futile to attempt to compare the Eranos contributions for degrees of excellence, but that of Professor Louis Beirnaert, of Paris, provoked, perhaps, a profounder resonance than any other. Over and above the accomplished presentation of the theme, "La dimension mythique dans le sacramentalisme chrétien," this effect was due primarily to the impression of being permitted to share the speaker's own experience, and of his having established between himself and his experience an objective relationship characterized by a rare humility. Father Beirnaert's main concern was with the symbolism of water, and its religious and psychological significance in the rite of Christian baptism. In this presentation the potential of a com-

mon denominator between religion and depth psychology revealed itself most clearly. The mythical implications and echoes (e.g., Jonah) as precursors of Roman Catholic conceptions of necrosis, the disintegration of sin in the baptismal waters, and regeneration through the power of Christ, could not but suggest the interpretations by psychologists of the symbols of water, immersion and birth, encountered in numberless dreams. Father Beirnaert himself drew a parallel between baptism and the descent into the depths of the psyche, but raised the question of difference of quality in the experience, since the element of terror is absent in the religious experience of baptism. This, he thought, is due to *agape,* an attitude in the faithful of complete acceptance—a femininity of the psyche beyond all femininity which reveals itself only before God.

The problem of the individual's relationship to the mythical realm was the subject of a psychologically oriented study by Dr. Erich Neumann, of Tel Aviv. This paper gave the impression of following a breathtaking path, poised between the abstract and the concrete, under the control of a determined and compelling guide. It was, in effect, a synopsis of Dr. Neumann's conception of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic evolution of the psyche. A pupil of C. G. Jung, Dr. Neumann bases his analysis upon Jung's formulations and distinguishes in the depths of the psyche (accompanied by reverberations of mythological motifs of trinity), besides the personal ego and the transpersonal self, a motive power which he terms centroversion—a crystallizing tendency which shifts the pivot of human experience from the more peripheral ego towards the central self. Like Jung, he sees psychic evolution as a dialectical process, between the individual and the mythical world of the unconscious. To reach the self, the ego must free itself from the enfolding power of the unconscious, while, at the same time, gaining for itself the energy invested in the archetypes; "Siegfried needs the dragon." This represents a process of psychic transformation mirrored in countless religious rituals, as well as in the symbolism of alchemy.

The final paper of the conference, by Professor Adolf Portmann, a biologist from Basel, was a stimulating and clarifying treatment of mythological themes in natural science. In the first part, he recounted the difficulties which modern science has encountered, since its birth in the seventeenth century, while caught in the dilemma between rationalism and mythical thinking. Its progress has been made possible

by its urge to free itself from the influence of powerful mythological images. For example, the image of Mercury's winged feet, and of other winged creatures, formed a great obstacle in the achievement of human aviation. The second part led, so to speak, below the strata of the human psyche into the animal substance. In it Dr. Portmann approached the question of the archetypes in biology, and mentioned a number of animal behavior patterns which suggest that the concept of the archetypes might find a further application in the sphere of biology.

In spite of the vast differences of approach and of emphasis between such papers as those of Father Beirnaert and Dr. Neumann, for instance, there comes to mind a quotation from Dr. Jung's introduction to his book on alchemy and psychology, which is relative not only to these two, but to the entire series: "The psyche is to God what the eye is to the sun."

CONGRESS FOR THE HISTORY OF RELIGION

Amsterdam, 1950

The organizing committee of the Dutch Society for the History of Religion announces the first post-war congress, to be held in Amsterdam, September fourth to ninth. From this announcement we quote the following:

The general theme of the forthcoming congress shall be: the mythic-ritual pattern in civilization. The questions to be studied and discussed at the congress are the following: can a mythic-ritual pattern be traced in the different civilizations? How to define its structure? Did this pattern subsist or is it broken? Which is its function in the living religions? The presupposition of these questions is an inquiry for the nature and the relation of myth and ritual and for their function in a certain religion.

G. Van der Leeuw, *President*
C. J. Bleeker, *Secretary*
Churchill-laan 290 I
Amsterdam

The Greek Cynics. By FARRAND SAYRE. Baltimore: J. H. Furst Company, 1948. 112 pp. $1.50.

In the Foreword to his treatise on *The Greek Cynics,* Dr. Sayre states it as his purpose "to show the Greek Cynics as they were and to explain their philosophy." That philosophy was not, in his interpretation, predominantly "a short cut to virtue," but amoralistic; not the principle of "following nature," but a kind of animalism; and not a primitivistic imitation "of the Golden Race of Hesiod," though in many ways a repudiation of progressive civilization. Greek Cynicism, rather, turns out to have been chiefly a pursuit of happiness through extremely individualistic freedom (like that of the vagrant ownerless dog) and through training in, or at least preaching of, such "virtues" as apathy and hardihood, idleness and poverty, and outspoken disrespect for prevailing customs, studies, pleasures, social relations, and religions, and for life itself.

As a sect, the Greek Cynics appear to have flourished from shortly before Cicero to some time previous to Augustine. Their teachings were a product of a period of political subjection and of cultural decline, and were not without influence upon early Christian methods and attitudes. Their sources of inspiration included, besides recurrent moods (like "hatred of all forms of superiority"), the eccentric Pythagorean Diodorus of Aspendus, anti-intellectual Sophists, the Skeptic Pyrrho, Bion of Borysthenes (a pupil of the mendicant teacher Crates of Thebes), and Indian Gymnosophists (for their connection with whom Dr. Sayre makes out a strong case).

The author maintains with emphasis: "The Cynics were not Socratics; their teaching was opposed to that of Socrates in almost every respect." Despite difficulties in the determination of Socratic teachings and discipleship, this position seems adequately defended in so far as the Cynics as a sect are concerned. In the interest of rejecting the tradition that Cynicism was founded by Diogenes of Sinope, the author sketches the few authenticated facts in the life of this "obscure vagrant of Corinth who gained publicity through a chance meeting with Alexander" and traces in detail the development of "the Diogenes legend" in which "a vagrant beggar with a criminal record, commonly called 'The Dog,' who did nothing, taught nothing and wrote nothing,

became a hero, a philosopher, a great man, a saint and perhaps, eventually, a god." The author also prefers Xenophon's account of Antisthenes as a Socratic to the traditions connecting Antisthenes with the Cynics and the Stoics; in this connection, he contends (on the basis of D. R. Dudley's study of ancient Sinopean coins) that Diogenes of Sinope did not come to Greece until at least sixteen years after the death of Antisthenes.

A valuable feature of Dr. Sayre's research consists in the bringing together of many classical sayings and references to substantiate the assertions made throughout the exposition. One Appendix gives 29 Fragments ascribed to Crates of Thebes; a second Appendix, 74 Fragments ascribed to Bion of Borysthenes. Evaluation of many of the quotations and citations made would require independent scholarship on the part of the reader; the author's own estimates of such materials are indicated in some cases in which he characterizes certain stories as inventions and distinguishes certain presumably reliable and unreliable accounts (pp. 2, 3, 26, 28, 56, 61, 63).

Although research of this kind is a profitable exercise of the scholarly imagination, the present state of scholarship offers little warrant for the expectation of seeing many of the ancient Greek schools "as they were." Since history has not permitted the Cynics and most other Greeks to speak to us in their own name but only through the reports of others, the fundamental need in this field is for a thorough sifting of the respective thought-patterns in our sources. Better justification for attempted reconstructions of Greek philosophies may conceivably be thus obtained than by assurances concerning Cicero's education (p. 2), the antiquity of Diogenes Laertius (p. 93), or the cumulative effects of the philosophies to be reconstructed upon ancient writers of various sorts. Within such limitations of our knowledge, however, the author observes a commendable cautious skepticism in his use of his source materials (e.g., in his strictures on Aristotle's disparagement of the followers of Antisthenes).

As a revision of a previous work, *Diogenes of Sinope, a Study of Greek Cynicism* (1938), the present treatment represents a notable advance in clarity and order of presentation. There is less reliance on Diogenes stories as indicating a possible development from a hedonistic Diogenean to an ascetic Socratic or Antisthenean version of Cynicism; a sharper separation is made between Cynicism and Stoicism;

and some polemical passages have been eliminated, especially those directed against the view of Gomperz that the Cynics may have advocated an enlightened despotism, and those directed against the view of Dudley that Diogenes may have protected the Sinopean currency from adulteration. Unfortunately, the original bibliography and list of "Sources of Information in Chronological Order" have not been reprinted. Moreover, the earlier study makes clearer the presumably intended contrast between "the Greek Cynics as they were" and "the non-existent ideal Cynic."

RICHARD HOPE

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The Vedāntic Buddhism of the Buddha. A collection of the historical texts translated from the original Pāli and edited by J. G. JENNINGS. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1948. cxvii, 679 pp. $16.00.

The author of this book lived and worked for nearly thirty years in the provinces which were the scene of Gotama's life work, Bihār and Orissa; he was formerly director of public instruction, and vice-chancellor of Patna University. He has given us an extensive work on Buddhism and has tried to present it from the actual teachings of its founder.

The *Introductory Notes* (pp. i-cxvii) are comprehensive in their content. Here Jennings, among other things, discusses rebirth or transmigration, the first sermon, the three characteristics of individuality, the last words of the Buddha, the edicts of Asoka, the essentials of Dhamma, Buddhist councils and the development of the canon, Hinduization, miracles, Dhamma and Stoicism, Gotama's journeys, the political background of Gotama's time, the religious and philosophical background, and the economic and social background.

The main theme of the book is the "Life of the Buddha Taken from the Pāli Texts." Here the author has gone to the canonical texts and presented in translation excerpts of passages free from influences later than the teaching of the Buddha. Part I (pp. 1-86) has the title, "The Buddha and the Dhamma": renunciation, enlightenment, the first converts, and the foundation of the Saṃgha. Part II (pp. 87-347) bears the heading, "The Buddha and the Saṃgha." Here we find a

discussion of the development of the Saṃgha, and the great tours of Gotama are presented in chronological order. Part III is devoted to the Buddha's continuous residence at Sāvatthi; the schism of Devadatta is also discussed in this connexion. Here is included the last visit of Gotama to Rājagaha. The Buddha's final tour went through the Maghada country (ch. 20), the Vajjian country (ch. 21), and the Mallan country (ch. 22). In the latter chapter the texts describe the last days and the death of the Buddha. Chapter 23, an Epilogue, treats the calling of the first great council. Appendices containing supplementary texts are found on pages 439-631. The indexes are valuable for Pāli lexicography and the location of proper names. Throughout the translated passages many Pāli words and phrases are cited; in this way the flavor of the original is well preserved, and the book thus may serve as an aid in the study of the Pāli language.

The student who reads this book without previous knowledge of Buddhism will note throughout the volume the emphasis upon the Four Noble Truths which culminate in the famous Noble Eightfold Path. Jennings has given these teachings the proper weight by making them the center of Gotama's teaching. He also points out that Buddhism is a reformed Brahmanism and that, consequently, certain Vedic or Vedāntic postulates are taken for granted.

The author notes that the doctrine of Karma is older than the time of the Buddha, and he carefully points out the original teaching of the Buddha in this respect. In the Hindu view, the same individual in successive rebirths acts and suffers in different lives, and the usual modern Buddhist view is the same. Jennings notes, however, that the original Buddhist view is altruistic; the actor is one, and the ultimate sufferer or beneficiary is another individual. In other words, there was originally a doctrine of altruistic responsibility or collective Karma, according to which every action, word, or thought of the individual, transient though he be, inevitably effects consequences to be suffered or enjoyed by others in endless succeeding generations. The individual is *anatta,* "without (durable or separate) self," and the author maintains that this word is opposed to the doctrine of rebirth or transmigration. Yet Jennings holds that this teaching is not in conflict with the idea of a Supreme Soul. The author makes the important observation (p. 478): "Buddhism perished in India because it failed to retain its original characteristics and relapsed into the popular, ritualistic, and

individualistic beliefs from which it had arisen. Among its losses was the ideal of heaven on earth, the peace of Nibbāna (Nirvāna) attained by the saint during this life."

We may assume with Jennings that much original material has been preserved in the Buddhist canonical books, but he well notes (p. xxii) that the original and canonical accounts of the Buddha's teaching have been touched and "improved" in later recensions, generation after generation, to bring them into accord with current ideas. "The method of the growth of the Books of the Canon is illustrated by the Buddhist theory that whatever is well said is a word of the Buddha."

Mr. Jennings has completed a task that involved much detailed labor; every page of the book has numerous footnotes and cross references. At the end of the General Introduction he acknowledges his indebtedness to his wife, who assisted him in the long period required for the final draft and made it possible for him "to carry on a work, planned and sketched in health, but composed and dictated in darkness." Such patience has its rewards in having made a contribution to scholarship. The reviewer recommends the book to students of Buddhism and of the history of religions. The author is to be congratulated upon the completion of this work.

HENRY SNYDER GEHMAN

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The Holy Quran with English Translation and Commentary. Vol. I. Published under the auspices of HAZRAT MIRZA BASHIR-UD-DIN MAHMUD AHMAD, Second Successor of the Promised Messiah, by the Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya. Qadian, India. Lahore, 1947. 15, cclxxvi, 968 pp. $12.50.

The English translation and Commentary on the Qur'ān of the Lahore group of the Aḥmadiyya Muslims in India has been available now for quite a few years, and here the present volume offers us the first part of the long-promised translation and Commentary of the Qadiani Aḥmadiyya, specimens of which this reviewer saw in Madras many years ago. Two further volumes are promised to complete the whole work. Like the Lahore book, it is not a work of serious scholarship but a work written for apologetic and propaganda. The modern

apologetic of various Muslim groups, however, is a subject of some interest, and for that reason it is, perhaps, not out of place to notice this book here.

This first volume contains Sūras I-IX, so that, if the commentary continues to be as extensive as it is in this first part, one wonders whether two more volumes of this size will suffice for the rest of the work. The text and translation appear at the top of the page and the commentary in double columns below, the commentary being separated from what is above it by a lined space containing what we are accustomed to call "marginal references." The Arabic text is given at the right, the English translation at the left, and all *sigla* referring to references or commentary are attached to the words in the translation.

The Arabic text has apparently been reproduced by lithography. It is the familiar Ḥafṣ text, though the editor has been content to follow a late form of Constantinople tradition as to the orthography of this text, instead of the old and pure Kūfan tradition on Ḥafṣ, such as the Egyptian standard text of A.H.1344 made a good first attempt at reproducing. The verses are numbered, and the *juz'* sections with their divisions are marked in the margin for those who prefer the old style method of reference. Pausal signs are marked in the text, but again are given according to a relatively late tradition. At the top of each page the *Sūra* number and the *Sipāra* number are printed, though they are given as Ch. and Pt. respectively. The *Rukū'* of each Sūra are also marked by an R with the appropriate number at the left of the English translation.

Each Sūra has prefixed to it a special Introduction, discussing the traditional date and place of revelation, the meaning of the title, and such matters, and giving an analysis of the subject matter of the Sūra. In this latter considerable ingenuity is exerted in an endeavor to show that there is coherence in thought between the various parts of the Sūra.

The Commentary is divided into two parts, linguistic and exegetical, which are labeled "Important Words" and "Commentary." This idea of discussing first any unusual words, or words that are important because of their technical sense, is good, and often the material given in these notes is quite useful as an indication to the reader who knows no Arabic of what the basis for the exegesis is. Too often, however, apologetic has been allowed to creep in even here. In these notes the

commentator leans heavily on the Jesuit lexicon, *Aqrab al-Mawārid,* and on Lane, and it is a little unfortunate that he so often gives the impression that Lane's authority is behind the interpretations he is setting forth, where this is not so at all. To take a random example: on page 672 a highly artificial distinction between the use of *ja'ala* and *khalaqa* is given, and Lane is noted as the authority. To anyone who knows Arabic it is ludicrous to think that so fine an Arabic scholar as Lane would have supported such a distinction, and when you look up Lane under *Ja'ala* you discover that he is following his usual custom of recording all the variant ideas he could find in the native Lexicons, and what this commentator has done is to support his distinction by selecting *one* meaning of *ja'ala* which Lane records from a *Muslim* lexicographer of late date. This is very far from what the commentary suggests.

The English translation reads smoothly and easily. Where, as so often, additional words are needed to bring out the sense in a translation, though they are not actually in the original, such words are here printed in italics. That the diction is stately befits a translation of a Holy Book, where a more colloquial style would savor of irreverence and so lose more than it gains. As a translation, however, it is highly apologetic. The translator is not concerned with rendering his original so as to give as nearly as possible the meaning it would have had for those who first heard it, but is anxious to give the original a meaning that will make a good impression on a modern audience whose background of education has been leavened by the Christian criticism of life. As a random example, take the verses he numbers 179, 180 of Sūra VII. The Arabic of verse 179 and the beginning of 180 reads:

"Whomsoever Allah guides, he is the *rightly* guided; and whomsoever He leads astray—they are the losers. Verily, We have created for Hell many from among both jinn and men."

This translation reads:

"He whom Allah guides is on the right path. And they whom He adjudges astray, these it is who shall be the losers. Verily, We have created many of the Jinn and men whose end shall be Hell."

Now it is true that, to the modern conscience, it is repugnant to think of God leading men astray, or creating men for hell, so this is translated out of the passage, though it so happens that both ideas are quite important for our study of the thought world of seventh century

Arabia when Muḥammad was preaching, and when we know from other sources that many of the ideas about which Muḥammad preached were being vigorously discussed in religiously minded circles. It is from this point of view, however, that both translation and commentary are extremely useful as a revelation of the way in which Indian Muslims in certain circles are endeavoring to reinterpret the Qur'ān in the light of some aspects of modern thought.

The whole work is prefaced by an exceedingly long general Introduction. After a statement of the particular need which it is thought that this new translation and commentary fills, the Introduction falls into five parts: (1) a demonstration that the Qur'ān supersedes all other Scriptures, since the Old and New Testaments, the Avesta, and the Vedas are limited in scope, full of contradictions, and imperfect in their teaching, whereas the Qur'ān, it is suggested, is perfect, and, as a matter of fact, is a fulfilment of prophecies in the earlier Scriptures; (2) an account of the life and mission of Muḥammad; (3) a statement of the orthodox theory as to how the Qur'ān came to its present form; (4) an outline of the main Qur'ānic teachings from the point of view of modern life; (5) some account of Aḥmad, the Promised Messiah, and his Promised Son.

The chief interest to us in this Introduction, again, is its apologetic: in the way it reacts to the teaching of the Old and New Testaments, and to the religions closer to it in India, in the manner in which it sets forth the life of Muḥammad, what therein it emphasizes, what it passes over in silence, and what it feels has to be explained away. It is very interesting to notice that, as a concession to the popular Hinduism which surrounds Islam in India, Krishna here takes a place beside Zoroaster among the Prophets.

The standard of scholarship shown by the work can perhaps best be illustrated by a quotation from the special introduction to Sūra I, al-Fātiḥa:

> The best-known name of the chapter, however, is *Al-Fātiḥa*. It is interesting to note that this very name occurs in a New Testament prophecy. In Rev. 10:1-2 it is written: "I saw another mighty angel come down from heaven . . . and he had in his hand a little book open: and he set his right foot upon the sea, and his left foot on the earth." The Hebrew word for "open" is *fatoaḥ* which is the same as the Arabic word *fātiḥa*. Rev. 10:3-4 says: "And when he (the angel) had cried, seven thunders uttered their voices." The seven thunders

represent the seven verses of this chapter. Christian scholars admit that the prophecy refers to the second advent of Jesus Christ, and this has been established by actual facts. The Holy Founder of the Ahmadiyya Movement, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who claimed to have fulfilled the prophecy relating to the second advent of Jesus, had constantly in his hands the little chapter, *Al-Fātiḥa,* and wrote several commentaries on it. He deduced arguments of his truth from its contents, and often referred to it in his speeches and writings and always used it as a model prayer, exhorting his disciples to do the same. He deduced from the seven short verses of this chapter truths which were not known before. It was as if the chapter had been a sealed book until its treasures were discovered by Hazrat Ahmad. Thus was fulfilled the prophecy contained in Rev. 10:4, "And when the seven thunders had uttered their voices, I was about to write: and I heard a voice from heaven saying unto me, Seal up those things which the seven thunders uttered, and write them not." This prophecy referred to the fact that the *Fatoaḥ* or *Al-Fātiḥa* would, for a time, remain a closed book, but that a time would come when it would become open.

The printing has been excellently done at the Civil and Military Gazette Office in Lahore, and the proofreading done so carefully as to put to shame the products of some Presses of much greater reputation which have been in our hands in recent months.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

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Sacred Fortress: Byzantine Art and Statecraft in Ravenna. By OTTO G. VON SIMSON. University of Chicago Press, 1948. xvi, 149 pp. 62 illustrations on 49 plates. $10.00.

While some of the brighter pages of the art of Christian Rome were being written in the Medieval period or "read" during the Renaissance and Baroque times, Ravenna lay in dormant obscurity. The fact that she was the last capital of the West Roman Empire and waged a "last-gasp" war to save it from the barbarians was forgotten. Likewise forgotten was the fact that for a time, during the sixth century, Ravenna was the real capital of Italy in religious and secular matters, while papal Rome merely vegetated under imperial neglect. The antique monuments of Ravenna were of little importance. Her Christian works eventually became known, but those of Christian Rome, which lent themselves more readily to doctrinal uses were investigated earlier. Like Constantinople, Ravenna was the center of religious dis-

putes, but its superb series of mosaics remained miraculously intact to declare their superiority over the contemporary monuments of Rome.

The early studies of the Ravenna mosaics were rather descriptive and antiquarian. Scattered studies in recent times have paid some attention to the influence of the liturgy or patristic exegesis, but no comprehensive treatment has been given to the most important cycles of mosaics until the appearance of the volume under review.

Mr. von Simson's book, which is primarily devoted to the iconographic problems, comes as a refreshing and challenging complement to the arid tabulation of formal and iconographic elements aiming at determining dates and identifying subjects. It is written very clearly and readably on a high intellectual plane, and apparently with substantial command of the primary and secondary sources. One of its aims is to show that beyond their ornamental qualities and elementary symbolism which would appeal to the average spectator, the mosaics are documents of significant political and theological aims. The intelligent layman will read the discussion with enthusiasm, the teacher, with profit for its stimulating interpretations; but the scholar will soon realize that he must read it with caution.

As the title suggests and the preface explains, the book is restricted to those works in Ravenna created during the life of Justinian, and represents that city as a politico-religious Byzantine outpost and a setting for dogmatic intrigues and statecraft which have become synonymous with "Byzantinism."

Each of the important monuments is given a chapter, but their analysis is meant to convey a central thesis which is also expounded lucidly in the first and sixth chapter. In substance, the thesis is that San Vitale, Sant' Apollinare in Classe, and the Chair of Maximianus are fundamentally Byzantine in conception and represent Justinian's will—expressed through his two great functionaries, Julianus Argentarius and Archbishop Maximianus—to conquer Ravenna, save it from the Arian Goth, and make it an Orthodox Byzantine capital in Italy, supreme even over Rome in ecclesiastical matters. But despite the prodigious efforts of these unusual men and the great expenditure of blood and money, Ravenna and Italy were destined to be lost by Byzantium to Rome. The transition is marked by a gesture of conciliation made by Agnellus—the last appointee of Justinian to the archbishopric of Ravenna—when he amended the mosaic cycle of Sant' Apollinare

Nuovo so that the Arian series was supplemented by the two processional groups of saints which are outwardly Byzantine but which, liturgically, are largely western or Catholic. Thus, Ravenna finally turned her back to the East and its undemocratic separation of the congregation from the liturgical mysteries, as embodied in the Byzantine iconostasis. In becoming Catholic she was to enjoy the democratic principles which were reflected—among other practices—in lay participation in the offertory and the performance of the liturgy in full view of the congregation.

Mr. von Simson supports his thesis with an overwhelming array of documents—historical, liturgical, patristic, etc. Unfortunately, many of them will probably remain in the realm of circumstantial evidence, for it is rarely possible to prove beyond doubt the immediate relation between a particular monument and a text which does not bear explicit reference to that monument. More than once the author has implied that the mere existence of a liturgical text or prayer in the Byzantine Empire is an ipso facto evidence of its use in determining certain iconographic motives in the mosaics of Ravenna. Furthermore, in his belief that all iconographic details are motivated by special texts, he has ignored the alternative or supplementary explanation that such details have a genealogy of their own and their existence may be accounted for by an artistic lineage independent of contemporary texts. Mr. von Simson's numerous citations to texts make everything fall neatly into place, and his lucid style contributes a good deal to the general effect of credibility. But the intricacy of his multilateral explanations leave more than a shade of doubt over the known facts. His thesis implies the existence of a superhuman archbishop who, in addition to his many ecclesiastical and administrative duties, found time to discover, assimilate and integrate the many patristic commentaries, liturgies, and prayers into one composition in which the political, theological and mystical meanings appear in several layers of the same organic design. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence, the ideal synthesis which Mr. von Simson seeks in the Ravenna churches—like that sought by Émile Mâle in the Gothic cathedrals—is destined to remain in large part conjectural. Yet the search will remain attractive in the face of so much tempting exegetic literature which has enriched—and sometimes confused—the meaning of the scriptures.

Since it is impossible to touch upon all the problems raised by this

interpretation of the Ravenna monuments without writing another book with a different set of illustrations to challenge or modify certain opinions, I shall concentrate upon a few items in the mosaics of San Vitale, the most important monument of that group.

According to Mr. von Simson, San Vitale was planned in Byzantium and was intended as a martyrion for the allegedly Ravennate martyr and his two sons, SS. Gervasius and Protasius. Since St. Vitalis had been claimed also by Milan, the founding of San Vitale before Ravenna was conquered by Belisarius, suggests the triple action of the legendary Byzantine statecraft by remote control: chastisement of the rival city of Milan, placation or circumvention of the Arian Goth, and the surreptitious but firm establishment of a powerful Eastern Orthodoxy by honoring a martyr of Ravenna.

In his belief that Maximianus was the moving spirit behind the complex iconographic program—rather than Ecclesius who was entrusted with the founding of the church—Mr. von Simson prefers the attribution of all the mosaics to the early years of his archiepiscopate, or between 546 and 549. He feels that the theological and political implications of the mosaics preclude an earlier origin. This seems to fit very well with his basic idea that almost all the Ravenna mosaics—except Sant' Apollinare Nuovo—were planned out carefully in advance and carried out faithfully in accordance with the program laid out by the archbishop in consultation with the Byzantine court.

This is an attractive theory to which the many cited texts lend plausibility. But, stylistically, the mosaics seem to divide into two categories, one consisting of the two imperial groups and the other of the remaining mosaics in the apse and forechoir. Mr. von Simson quite rightly feels that the differentiation of the chief figures in the portraits reveals characterizations of a high realistic order, although I am not prepared to follow him in seeing in the thin face of Theodora an ailing lady "already in the shadow of death." But whatever the realism of the faces, the bodies and the heavy draperies are schematized and appear more two-dimensional than the figures in the other groups of mosaics. The companions of Justinian and Theodora seem to be stepping on each others' dangling feet, if indeed they could walk on feet which are so inorganically related to the bodies above. In all these features the other mosaics are superior. The figures are more three dimensional, better and more freely composed in adequate space, which is enriched

with landscape and atmosphere. The differences reinforce the opinion that Maximianus was probably responsible only for the imperial groups, which bear a more "Byzantine" character. After all, the church was begun by Bishop Ecclesius in 526, and, according to customary practice, the choir was the first portion to be built. During the remaining six years of his life something more than the walls of the choir must have been completed. The dedicatory inscription ascribes the decoration of San Vitale to Maximianus. But, in view of the probable fact that the body of the church was practically finished and decorated under him, and that inscriptions usually claim more for the prelate who completes and dedicates the monument than for the one who begins it, we have no other means than stylistic and iconographic analysis for determining the portions of the mosaics which may be assigned to the two prelates. The comparisons made above suggest that Ecclesius was probably responsible for all but the imperial groups. This conclusion is not inconsistent with Mr. von Simson's theory that it was planned in Constantinople as a Byzantine "Trojan horse," and it should follow logically that something more than its outward form was given to Ecclesius for execution.

Consider the apsidal composition representing Christ seated on the globe of the world, flanked by two angels and "receiving" St. Vitalis on one side and Ecclesius on the other. Mr. von Simson's interpretation of the presence of Ecclesius (p. 24) is as follows; Ecclesius had to be honored as the founder of the church, but since he had been a friend of Theodoric and Pope John, he was not worthy of being represented with the Emperor, whose company was reserved by Maximianus for himself. Consequently he was placed in the apse with the Lord and St. Vitalis. I confess that the motives imputed to "Byzantium"—really Maximianus—appear strange and tenuous. A simpler explanation is the fact that, after Ecclesius built the choir and, after a time-honored custom of bishop-founders, had made a mosaic in the apse representing the Lord offering St. Vitalis the crown of martyrdom and himself offering the model of the martyrion dedicated to that saint. The existence of such a mosaic with and by Ecclesius would assume the completion of at least the choir and a usable portion of the church in order to make use of the choir. Since there are no essential differences between the style of the apsidal composition and that of the "liturgical" scenes, their attribution to Ecclesius seems very probable. Naturally, in view

of the fact that this work was going on under the eyes of Theodoric's successors, and since Ecclesius must have still entertained some measure of friendship towards the lately departed king (and at the same time being indebted to Justinian), he could not have gone so far as to endanger his project by introducing portraits of the Byzantine emperor and his wife. This certainly could be postponed until Ravenna was safely in the hands of the Byzantines! In this connection, the dating and attribution of the two groups of mosaics is perhaps less important than the consideration of Mr. von Simson's belief that the apsidal mosaic and those of the forechoir are iconologically Byzantine in origin, presumably determined by the multifarious aims of Maximianus and Justinian.

According to him, the representation of Christ on the globe coincides with the Hymn of the Resurrection of Ephrem the Syrian (d. 378), which describes the second advent of Christ for the resurrection of the dead (p. 35). "Christ appears seated upon his 'awe-inspiring throne' and with his hand he distributes the crown of glory to his saints. This is unquestionably the scene depicted in the apse of San Vitale." But I find little cause for such certainty, for I do not understand why Ephrem's hymn had no similar effect upon East Christian art, why an "awe-inspiring throne" should be conceived only as a globe, and why this method of representing Christ could not have come from the fifth century apsidal composition in Santa Costanza, in Rome. Here is an instance in which existing monuments seem to be, in part, more satisfactory than the general language of a text.

Consider another instance; the representation of the Lamb of God on the groin vault of the forechoir. Mr. von Simson's says that

> the image of the Lamb was introduced into Roman rite only at the end of the seventh century by Pope Sergius I, a Syrian. But in the liturgies of the East this symbol of the Christian sacrifice appears at an earlier date, and we are justified in interpreting its representation in San Vitale as alluding to the Eucharistic liturgy (p. 24).

One cannot contradict the liturgical significance of the Lamb nor its meaning in the Eastern rite, but it is strange that the representation of the Agnus Dei is unknown in East Christian monuments, whereas it is a common feature in West Christian works from at least the fifth century, as numerous sculptural and mural monuments testify. More-

over, the closest approximation of the San Vitale motive was in existence almost a century earlier in the vault of the Oratory of St. John the Evangelist in the Lateran, built under Hilarius (461-468).

We may conclude the counterevidence of the monuments themselves by considering the representations of the Four Evangelists in San Vitale. Mr. von Simson thinks that like other mosaics in the forechoir, they have eucharistic significance, for they are the "symbols of the sacramental life of the Christians" (p. 26); that this significance was revealed to the catechumens in the ancient ceremony of *in apertiore aurium;* and that the juxtaposition of the evangelists over the prophets is in accordance with the Eastern parallelism of the two dispensations as shown in the Christian Topography of Cosmas Indicopleustes. These are interesting observations, but they hardly prove the Eastern inspiration of the evangelists and their symbols. Their correlation as represented in San Vitale has been attributed by A. M. Friend, on good grounds, to St. Jerome. Representations of the evangelists with their symbols do not appear in East Christian art before the late Byzantine period, and then only under Western influence. As for the parallelism of the two dispensations in the mosaics, we need but remember the prefigurative iconography of the catacombs and the various correlations of different quadripartite categories in West Christian art and patristic literature to realize that the predilection for such correlations is peculiar to the Western mind.

Furthermore, Agnellus, whom Mr. von Simson finds usually reliable, says in the *Liber Pontificalis* that Maximianus caused to be copied two vulgate bibles which were sent to him from Rome. Friend and Morey would, therefore, attribute the iconography of the evangelists to that event (Morey, *Early Christian Art,* p. 221). To the reviewer, however, the same evidence suggests less the probability that the author portraits in Ravenna were copied by Maximianus from a Roman Bible than the probable fact that he depended upon Rome for some of his ecclesiastical reforms. On the other hand, the stylistic distinction indicated above between the two kinds of mosaics in the choir of San Vitale is not inconsistent with the attribution of the liturgical and apsidal mosaic to Ecclesius or with the probable dependence of Ravenna of his time upon Rome for part of its iconography.

Despite the apparent efforts of Mr. von Simson to force many of the

iconographic motives into Byzantine text-molds in order to prove the devious machinations of Justinian and Maximianus, there are a number of things that can be said in his favor. He has given us some remarkable vignette portraits of the personages figuring in the Byzantine history of Ravenna. In his hands the mosaics of Sant' Apollinare in Classe received the most sympathetic and intelligent consideration. Those of Sant' Apollinare Nuovo, despite the difference in style and chronology, have been integrated and made to focus upon the mystical and liturgical significance of the altar. The foregoing criticism was not meant to invalidate completely Mr. von Simson's admirable effort to resolve the many iconographic problems of the Ravenna monuments, but rather to suggest that textual evidence—especially liturgical and patristic—must be used cautiously, and in conjunction with the more tangible testimony of the monuments themselves and their prototypes. Mr. von Simson has erred—albeit more stimulatingly—on the textual side, as other art historians have erred in limiting themselves to unimaginative archeological dissections of style and iconography, with little attention to liturgical and exegetical texts. It is hoped that his challenging treatment will induce other studies of the monuments of Ravenna so as to redress the unbalance, and to explore further the significance of the deservedly great mosaics of the "ill-fated" western capital of Justinian's empire.

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A Study of the Summa Philosophiae of the Pseudo-Grosseteste. By Charles King McKeon. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. xii, 226 pp. $3.25.

Scholarship is obviously advanced by the editing of medieval writings previously known only in manuscript form, but it is also enriched by analytical studies of the content, structure, and doctrine of such works, once the texts have been reliably established. Using the well-known edition of the *Summa Philosophiae* of the Pseudo-Grosseteste published in the *Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Band IX) by Ludwig Baur in 1912, the author of this study undertakes to analyze the work of the Pseudo-Grosseteste so as to

"afford a chance to view at first hand, against the historical background from which they derive, some of the currents and cross currents of the thought of that fluent century" (Preface, p. vii).

An introductory section is devoted to a statement of the purpose of this monograph, a description of the *Summa Philosophiae,* a discussion of its authorship, an examination of the first treatise of the *Summa* "as indicative of philosophic affiliations and tendencies," and a brief account of the Pseudo-Grosseteste's reference to the *moderni* and his position on questions at issue in his day. The author's analyses of the subsequent treatises, for the most part, follow the plan of the *Summa* itself, dealing successively with "Truth and Knowledge," "Principles of Metaphysics," "The Parts of Metaphysics," and "The Philosophy of Nature." Mr. McKeon concludes his study with a final section, less analytical than the previous ones, "devoted to achieving a more panoramic perspective" and ending with a short essay on "The Platonism and Poetry of the *Summa.*" Four appendices are added: (1) a plan or scheme giving in succinct tabular form an outline of the contents and structure of the *Summa;* (2) a table designed to illustrate philosophic relationships relative to the intellectual background of the *Summa Philosophiae* from Plato to the thirteenth century; and two short essays, (3) one considering certain aspects of the metaphysics of the *Summa* in relation to "The Contemporary Platonism of Professor Whitehead," (4) the other on the natural philosophy of the *Summa* as applied to optics.

The book is provided with a fairly detailed table of contents, a good bibliography and a copious index.

The author's introduction gives a clue to the method adopted in dealing with the questions which form the subject-matter of the subsequent chapters of his book. He explains that, given the "diversity of inspiration and source material" evident in the work of the Pseudo-Grosseteste, on the one hand, and the fact that, on the other hand, "we choose to assume" (for reasons primarily aesthetic in character) that the *Summa* is an organic whole, . . . we are obliged in the very beginning to select an essential pattern of thought as determining the author's procedure" (p. 4). Having selected as that pattern "Platonism" or "Christian Platonism," the author declares it to be "the essential character and aim of this study . . . to interpret the *Summa*

Philosophiae as exemplifying principles of "Christian Platonism" as an hypothesis used instrumentally "to evoke insight into the historical, logical and metaphysical character of the *Summa*. . . . And the insights thus evoked will, ideally, be themselves instrumental in providing a deeper understanding of the nature of human thought, human history and human aspiration" (p. 5).

In view of this decision regarding method and aim, it is understandable that Chapter II, "Truth and Knowledge," should begin with a sketch of the "Christian-Platonic" teaching of St. Augustine before any study of the metaphysics of the *Summa* itself is undertaken, since it is against that background that the author aims to interpret the *Summa*. For the same reason, we are not surprised to find excursions into, or brief disquisitions on, the thought of Plato, Aristotle, Avicenna, Avicebron, and others introduced, as occasion arises, among the analytical passages of the succeeding chapters; and we find it quite natural that the author should conclude his work by some good prose writing on the poetry of the *Summa,* climaxed with a long quotation from *Paradise Lost.*

In his description of the *Summa Philosophiae,* Mr. McKeon notes first that Ludwig Bauer convincingly established that Robert Grosseteste could not have been the author of this *Summa* (scholars are generally agreed on this point), and that it was written during the last third of the thirteenth century, probably between 1265 and 1275. A list is then given of the topics dealt with in the nineteen treatises comprised in the *Summa.* These are further divided into two hundred and eighty-four chapters, each duly headed by the author. Despite the number of chapters in this work, it really is not a very voluminous one; it covers only three hundred and sixty-eight octavo pages of Baur's edition of the works of Robert Grosseteste.

On the question of the authorship of the *Summa Philosophiae,* Mr. McKeon does not pretend to offer any new or original views. He contents himself with summarizing the opinions which historians (Bauer, Geyer, Little, Duhem, De Wulf, Richard McKeon, Thompson, Grabmann) have already proposed and outlining the arguments in favor of Robert Kilwardby as the most likely person to have written it. It would be most desirable, of course, to have the question more fully explored, but Mr. McKeon did not undertake to do so in this book.

His purpose was to interpret the content of the *Summa,* not to propose a solution of the problem of its authorship.

The analysis of Treatise I as indicative of philosophic affiliations and tendencies reveals the ground-plan of Mr. McKeon's subsequent interpretations of the Pseudo-Grosseteste's work. The author of the *Summa* writes a compendious history of philosophy as an introduction to his book and discusses at some length the respective spheres of "theosophy," "theology," and "philosophy," the function of reason in each, and the relative value of their teaching in respect of truth.

Mr. McKeon summarizes this treatise showing clearly the Pseudo-Grosseteste's conception of "a single universal wisdom partially revealed even to pagans, achieving its formal perfection with Christian revelation." The means he adopts to develop that conception was to write a compendium of the history of thought from the sons of Noah to St. Albert the Great. Roger Bacon, a contemporary of the author of the Summa, adopted a similar device for a similar purpose, as Mr. McKeon aptly notes, in the second part of his *Opus Majus.* From his examination of the Pseudo-Grosseteste's remarks on the Platonists and Aristotle, Mr. McKeon concludes that the Pseudo-Grosseteste held both Plato and Aristotle in high esteem, Plato for his wisdom, Aristotle for his exact knowledge, and that, consequently, "it may perhaps be supposed that the author in his own philosophy will be concerned with harmonizing Platonic wisdom with Aristotelian rigor and certainty" (p. 15).

The author of the *Summa* distinguishes three grades among those who expound the single universal wisdom, the history of which he had just outlined: "theosophers" (proclaimers of the law, prophets, inspired saints), "theologians" (interpreters or expounders of "theosophy"), and "philosophers" (those who seek causal and quidditative explanations). It would seem that philosophers cannot reach beyond opinion and that philosophy itself is but the handmaid of Theology. In these considerations, Mr. McKeon finds an indication of "a nearness to Roger Bacon and a remoteness from St. Thomas" (p. 18) in the thought of the Pseudo-Grosseteste.

Mr. McKeon concludes his Introduction with a consideration of the thought of the author of the *Summa* in relation to questions of contemporary import. This section of the Introduction is based on texts

quoted from various treatises in the work and points to the conclusion that the Pseudo-Grosseteste is favorably disposed towards Roger Bacon's outlook, antagonistic to St. Thomas and not, in some matters, opposed to St. Albert the Great.

Mr. McKeon remarks, also, that one may gather from this treatise that the author was "widely read in Aristotle, church writings, and Arabian philosophy and science" (p. 23) a true, but not very significant statement, if intended as a clue to the identity of an author living in an age where scores of men would qualify.

The body of the work, Sections II to V, constitute an analytic summary and interpretation of the *Summa*. The author has obviously given much time and hard work to the task of elucidating a none too clear, though decidedly important, medieval treatise. Cautious scholarship and keen insight mark Mr. McKeon's study of the Pseudo-Grosseteste's work, and his conclusions regarding the "Christian-Platonic" character of the thought expounded in the *Summa* are propounded with modesty and scholarly reserve.

Coupled with this accuracy of research, reference, and analysis, there appears in Mr. McKeon's work certain controversial, almost polemical, overtones. This is particularly marked in various footnotes throughout the book in which Mr. McKeon seems to think he has not only to expound, but also to defend the views of the Pseudo-Grosseteste. Frequently a note of lyricism in the interpretation of a passage suggests that the author is at times influenced by aesthetic rather than philosophical considerations in his analysis of his text. There may be something to be said for the "simple final judgment regarding the nature of the *Summa*—as a poem of light and darkness" (p. 193), but one may well doubt whether the Pseudo-Grosseteste is more poetic in his utterances than many another "Christian Platonist" of the Middle Ages—Witelo for instance.

Although the scholar will still find it more advantageous to consult the Bauer edition of the *Summa Philosophiae*, Mr. McKeon's work will prove decidedly useful in any discussion of the interpretation of the Pseudo-Grosseteste's thought.

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The Critical Theology of Theodore Parker. By John Edward Dirks. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. viii, 173 pp. $2.25.

Among American religious thinkers of the first half of the nineteenth century, Theodore Parker stands out as one of the most distinguished. This scholarly new work upon him, therefore, is to be welcomed. Any reader will be well-versed, indeed, in the literature of the period who does not find it enlightening. The basic question which the author sets out to answer is, What was Parker's relation to Transcendentalism? To solve this problem, one must first form a fairly definite notion of Transcendantalism, and there, in truth, is the rub; for so many constituents went into the making of that porridge—Mysticism, Romanticism, Platonism, Kantianism, Idealism, even Hindu Pantheism. Is it not, then, one may suggest, best envisaged as a multifarious reaction against the extreme emphasis upon sense-awareness as the basis of knowledge to which the New England disciples of Locke—too forgetful, perhaps, of his ideas of reflection—had whole-heartedly committed themselves? Is it possible from any other standpoint to view such very different men as William Ellery Channing, James Freeman Clarke, Theodore Parker, and Ralph Waldo Emerson as participators in the same movement?

The suggestion is not one which commends itself to Mr. Dirks. Some more definitive answer, he thinks, must be given. The principal characteristics of Transcendentalism he identifies, accordingly, with self-reliance, a contempt for traditions and institutions, a reliance upon individual insight and intuition, and an "oracular style." "Of these traits," he justly remarks, "Emerson has been regarded as the chief incarnation" (p. 23).

It is with Emerson, therefore, that he proceeds to contrast Parker. And the contrast is, indeed, illuminating; for the latter totally repudiated the method of uncritical reliance upon individual inspiration. On the contrary, it is the human consciousness as such which he investigates, its evolution through the three stages of sentiment, ideas, and action; its fourfold manifestations in terms of religion, intellect, emotion, and morality; and the a priori universals thus disclosed he proceeds to validate by an appeal to history. Thus Parker's intention was to stress the union of the reason and the understanding, and to co-ordinate the a priori and the a posteriori methods. Hence it follows

that, if Emerson was the Transcendentalist *par excellence,* Parker was not one; although standing in close connection with the movement.

All this is of historic interest and certainly worth bringing to light. Yet there is another question which the author might have raised, and one that is not only of historic but of present-day actual and pressing interest. It is the question of the relation of the metaphysical to the historic element in Christianity. This was the storm-center of controversy in Parker's day, and so it is in ours. It was in the Unitarian denomination that the issue first came to a head, and Parker's virtual excommunication by his co-religionists bears eloquent witness to the intensity of feeling aroused. Early Unitarianism, with its Lockian background, had been an historical religion par excellence. The centrality of the historic Jesus was its basic tenet, and the phrase, "The Lord Jesus Christ," which so excited the ire of the founders of the Free Religious Association, was its very watchword.

For Parker, however, as Mr. Dirks points out (p. 128), the distinction between natural and revealed religion no longer holds good. The Absolute Religion is independent of temporal events. Its principles are true in the same way that the laws of mathematics are true, and its content can be deduced by an analysis of human reason. Of this analysis the study of comparative religion furnishes an empirical confirmation, in that it discloses an actual historical evolution in the direction of this ideal. Moreover, the first man to envisage the ideal in all its fullness, and to preach it to his fellow men, was Jesus of Nazareth; hence the believer in the Absolute Religion may with perfect legitimacy assume the name of Christian.

The vine which Theodore Parker planted, and which once shaded all the New England hills, has now fallen on evil days. The boar out of the Barthian wood doth waste it, and the Logical Positivist doth devour it. Dogmatism and scepticism have united in a common onslaught upon rational religion. Hence Parker, who may justly be called the father of religious rationalism in this country, is a figure of peculiar interest. One could wish that Mr. Dirks had attempted an evaluation of his position in the light of subsequent thought and contemporary controversy. It may be, however, that he will yet attempt it in another volume. In view of his thorough acquaintance with the literature of the period, it is surely permissible to hope that he may.

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Young Mr. Newman. By MAISIE WARD. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948. xvii, 477 pp. $4.50.

So much of Newman's story has been told again and again that it is strange that this should be the first study to concern itself wholly with his earlier years. Undoubtedly a contributing factor to this omission was the Cardinal's own wish, adhered to by his official biographer, that his biography begin with the year in which he became a Roman Catholic. As a consequence, Catholic writers have, for the most part, followed the official biographer. Another contributing factor has been the fact that Protestant writers have been more concerned with Newman's relation to the Oxford Movement and its aftermath than with the years prior to his leadership of that movement. Perhaps even more important is the classic treatment of the history of his religious opinions which Newman himself gave in his *Apologia.* So complete and revealing was this that many writers have been content to take at face value Newman's appraisal of the development of his ideas. But, whatever the causes, the first half of Newman's life has been neglected by biographers. It is this neglect which Miss Ward has corrected in her study of Newman up to his forty-fifth year.

Readers of Miss Ward's study of Chesterton know her to be a biographer who is completely at home in the nineteenth-century England about which she writes. As in her book on Chesterton, so in this portrait of Newman, the reader is impressed by the manner in which Miss Ward has fused a highly readable account of the progress of a distinguished mind with the social and theological background against which it developed. Her more recent book has an added interest because of the connections of her family with Newman. Her father, Wilfred Ward, wrote the standard work on Newman's life as a Catholic; her grandfather, William George Ward, was one of the leading figures in the Oxford Movement. It was William George Ward who first used the phrase *Credo in Newmannum,* and who said to a priest friend, "You Roman Catholics know what it is to have a Pope. Well, Newman is my Pope." Still further interest is given Miss Ward's book in that it includes some hitherto unpublished material selected from a diary of Newman's and a large number of family letters. By careful selection and connection, Miss Ward has literally enabled the letters to tell their own story. (Parenthetically, the author's claim to have discovered

"quantities" of such unpublished material is deceptive. Only occasionally in her quotations will scholars find writings not already incorporated in other works on Newman. Miss Ward's claim should not, however, detract from the worth of the new material that is to be found in her book.) The combination of the author's skill as a biographer, her thorough knowledge of the period and personal enthusiastic affection for her subject, plus her use of unpublished sections from Newman's letters and other documents has resulted in a study of Newman that will be welcomed, particularly by the general reader, for whom, according to Miss Ward's own statement, the book is written.

The author begins her book by stating that she is concerned with the person of Newman as child, boy, and man. "The development of *this* child into *that* man," she writes, "has for me an intense fascination." In tracing that development she deals with two groups. First, there is the Newman family. Its members wrote continually to one another, and the letters give us a vivid and intimate picture. There seems little doubt that John was, from the first, the family favorite, the son and brother in whom mother and sisters took most pride, and to whom they turned for guidance both intellectual and spiritual. This made even more tragic the cleavage that resulted when Newman became a Roman Catholic. As the jacket on the book states, "Not to know Newman in his family life is not to know the man at all."

The second group studied by the author is that remarkable body of men who made up the Oriel Common Room: Pusey, Keble, Hurrel Froude, Copleston, Whately, Hawkins, Thomas Arnold, Oakeley, Ward, *et al.* These men were later to be the leaders in both the Catholic and the Liberal movements in the Church of England; some of them would follow Newman into the Roman Church. Whether as friends or antagonists, they contributed to his development. Newman was twenty-one when, in 1822, he wrote in his diary, "I have this morning been elected Fellow of Oriel. Thank God, thank God." Oriel and Oxford were to be his life until his retirement to Littlemore following the publication in 1841 of Tract 90. By concentrating on these years and the men associated with him, Miss Ward has given us a fascinating picture of the younger Newman. (It is not, however, as the jacket claims, "a new Newman.") Miss Ward states, "Newman is for most people rather a shadowy figure until he becomes an aged Cardinal, but I see him more and more clearly as young Mr. Newman of Oriel." The reader sees

the same portrait: a brilliant young man, an acknowledged leader among his colleagues, "a combination . . . of interest in self and in others" whose "whole mind would focus itself—on someone else's troubles, on his own" (p. 220) yet, withal, one whose contemplative genius was to find itself in the "unique vocation—at once spiritual and intellectual—of drawing the world nearer to God not by prayer but by thought" and who, as a consequence, would later find himself moving "more among the early Fathers than among his living friends close as they were to him" (p. 228). Finally, though hers is a story of Newman rather than a history of the Oxford Movement, the author has presented, largely through first-hand material, the back and forth movements in Newman's own mind, and in the minds of those associated with him, as he slowly worked out his own eventful decision. Almost half of the book is devoted to Newman's part in the development of this movement which was so profoundly to effect the religious life of England and the Christian world.

As might be expected, considering her own family background, the author's presentation of Newman is moving and sympathetic. At the same time, it is objective and critical. She does not hesitate to point out that, in Newman's later copying of his early writings (the letters and notations in his private journal he transcribed three times prior to their final arrangement in 1885), he was inclined to see the early years through the Cardinal's eyes. Nor is she unwilling to differ with the Cardinal's judgment, as is illustrated in her caveat regarding Newman's acid comment in his old age concerning the vicar who succeeded him at St. Mary's (p. 425). So objective is the author's presentation, despite her sympathy with her subject, that this reviewer found himself wanting to retitle her opening chapter of Newman's childhood, "Portrait of a Prig." He experienced the same uncharitable feeling on reading, later in the book, Mrs. Newman's lament, in 1835, that her son, whose previous sermons had meant so much to her, should send her his most recent volume with the reproach, "I do not feel any particular interest or sympathy with your opinions"! In brief, Miss Ward has given us a picture of a man, not a saint. And yet, so complete a picture is it that, despite the human elements of character which emerge in her story, the reader will probably agree with her final judgment, "That Newman was a chosen instrument of God none can doubt. That he or others understood that choice, I think few would maintain"

(p. 457). Indeed, one may fittingly apply to this study the same tribute the author pays Liddon's life of Pusey, "Fortunate the man who finds a skillful and sympathetic biographer."

In her Introduction, the author writes, "I am convinced that the Catholic and Roman Church is the Church directly established by Christ. It is, therefore, impossible that . . . all I say can please people who do not share this opinion." It is on this score that this review would criticize certain aspects of the book. Admittedly, the author has been objective in tracing the development of Newman's mind from Evangelicalism to Roman Catholicism. Miss Ward's Catholicism, however, has caused her to be too free in her judgments of persons. For example, because he did not accept the conclusions of orthodox Catholic thought, Blanco White is characterized as "excellently equipped with scholastic phraseology" but lacking in an understanding of theology (p. 144). Of White, however, Dr. Liddon declared, "It is not too much to say that he is the real founder of the modern Latitudinarian school in the English Church." In like manner, Hampden's character is disparagingly referred to (p. 141), and James Anthony Froude, who earlier had viewed Newman as supremely a leader but who later became an agnostic, is dismissed as having an "acute but shallow" mind (p. 350). The disturbing feature of these judgments is that almost always they are of men who differed with the Catholic emphasis made by Newman. At times, also, Miss Ward writes as a propagandist. One illustration must suffice. After describing the society of early nineteenth-century England, in Belloc's phrase, as the Servile State, the author adds:

> Often today we meet with the remark that Belloc's prophecy has been fulfilled and that we are living in his servile state. But we are not. We are living in *a* servile state but quite a different one. In his vision part of the population was going to be enslaved to work for the other part. But today we are all enslaved to the state. Belloc was in fact looking back rather than forward. . . . Would that our ancestors had seen what they were creating and had saved England as a property-owning democracy and a Christian land (p. 236).

The reader is justified in asking how much such a passage adds to an understanding of Newman, and to what extent its inclusion in the book is due to Miss Ward's Catholicism and the position of her Church as declared in the Syllabus of Errors condemned by Pius IX in 1864 and re-enunciated several times since then. The most apparent instance

of the author's Catholic zeal is found in her evaluation of Newman's sermons as Vicar of St. Mary's (pp. 339-42). Commenting on the somberness characteristic of many of these sermons, she writes, "Without the Catholic teaching on the Sacrament of Penance, he dares not pronounce that repentance is followed by full forgiveness in this life. . . . The absence of the Church gives us, I think, a key to the absence of joy in many of the sermons" (this judgment is followed by three pages describing the joyousness of the Catholic faith). Certainly, to support such a judgment one would have to compare the later sermons and addresses of Newman with those made prior to his acceptance of Catholicism. In this reader's experience, to do so is to make highly questionable Miss Ward's conclusion. Many of Newman's writings as a Catholic are as somber as his sermons at St. Mary's. Possibly the somberness of his writings was a matter primarily of temperament.

The foregoing criticisms should not be construed as strictures on Miss Ward's book as a whole. The objections made are but to minor blemishes in a work which combines careful research with excellence of presentation. To read it is a rewarding experience.

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Den naturliga teologiens problem hos Karl Barth. By Benkt-Erik Benktson. Lund: Carl Bloms Boktryckeri A.-B., 1948. xlii, 304 pp. Kr. 10.

Without restricting himself to any one period of Barth's theological development, the writer of this scholarly book proposes to investigate "a central theological problem" (p. xii). A study of Barth's struggle with the problem of natural theology will, the author maintains, lead one into the very center of his theology and of dialectical theology as a whole (p. xxvi). The theology which is attacked by the dialectical theologians holds as "a more or less self-evident assumption" (p. xxviii) that human existence is in possession of something with which revelation can make contact. That which man knows by nature concerning God is perhaps inadequate, but it is not without significance. Though a meager rudiment, it, nevertheless, points in the direction of the whole truth (p. xxviii). A defense against the dialectical theology

must, therefore, be a defense of the point of contact between God and man (pp. xxxi f.).

Chapter One is a discussion of Brunner's struggle with that problem and the resultant debate between him and Barth. In Chapter Two, the duel between Barth and Brunner becomes a "triangle-drama" (p. xxxviii) as the author brings Bultmann and the theology which busies itself with Heidegger's existential philosophy into the discussion. Bultmann's attempt to solve the problem of natural theology with the assistance of Heidegger's philosophy is declared by Barth to be more interesting, but also more dangerous than Brunner's *theologia naturalis vulgaris* (p. 43). Barth's critical attitude toward Bultmann has, however, received scant attention, because of a general lack of clarity in the prevailing conceptions of the content and influence of the existential philosophy (p. 43).

> We are now in a position to see more clearly what it is that led Barth to express himself as sharply as he does in *Nein!* It is not Brunner's distinction between formal and material imago against which he is primarily contending. That way of thinking about the point of contact appears to him as relatively free from danger. It is rather in the attempt to find a point of contact in the concrete human existence by means of an exploiting analysis of the current fashionable philosophy that he sees the actual danger (p. 79).

In their ways of thinking, Barth and Heidegger have very little in common, despite the fact that they have both learned of Kierkegaard and both have a common enemy in Descartes. It is a mistake to intrude Heidegger as an intermediary between Kierkegaard and Barth on the assumption that Barth has been dependent upon Heidegger (p. 95). When Barth uses the words "existence" and "existential," there have been those who were ready at once to recognize the influence of Heidegger.

> It is certainly obvious that this is incorrect. When Barth, in the preface to *Der Römerbrief*, professes himself a follower of Kierkegaard, the interests which led him to do so are altogether different from those which (later!) led Heidegger to do the same. Just as Barth searches in Kierkegaard for the expression of a theological intention, while Heidegger is drawn to the great Danish thinker by totally different motives, it is a primarily religious interest which leads Barth to direct his criticism against Descartes, while Heidegger's polemic against Descartes is . . . directed against a philosophic and more exactly defined epistemological background. If Heidegger's thought is subjected to theological

appraisement, he must also, according to Barth, be regarded as belonging to the theological Cartesianism which Barth recognizes as the source of natural theology during the latest centuries and in opposition to which he, therefore, declares an unalterable "no" (pp. 95 f.).

Although no analysis of human existence can reveal a point of contact for revelation, and the presumption of natural theology in assuming the existence of such an independent human readiness for the knowledge of God must be rejected, the inevitable problem of the point of contact remains for Barth, if revelation itself is not to be discarded (pp. 101 ff.). Such a point of contact must not, however, be regarded as a natural human endowment but must be viewed as the act of God (pp. 106 f.). The author calls attention to Barth's difficulties with reference to the doctrine of the *imago Dei*. Having indulged in earlier polemic against the failure to grasp the drastic import of the alleged loss of the *imago Dei*, Barth later declares that the assertion of such a loss is unbiblical. Man cannot lose that which he never possessed. "This changed point of view is bound up with another new feature in the interpretation of the *imago Dei* to which Barth gives expression in connection with the exposition on creation. The *imago Dei* is no longer viewed exclusively as God's purpose for man, actualized in Christ" (p. 114). The analysis of the *imago Dei* concept in Genesis leads Barth to an interpretation of imago "as something which man by virtue of creation possesses as a human being" (p. 114). Barth believes, however, that this exposition of imago excludes the possibility that human potentialities of a religious kind exist as given in the imago (pp. 115 f.). According to Benktson, this interpretation leads Barth a long way in the direction of the interpretations against which he had formerly fought so energetically (p. 116). This development in the thought of Barth must, no doubt, be understood in the light of the fact that his *Nein!* to the point of contact had not been sufficiently inclusive.

The point of contact as a *human* possibility was denied but it was affirmed as *God's* possibility. It was regarded as a human impossibility but, none the less, as a human necessity which was actualized by a special Divine intervention. Not even between this view and Brunner's does there exist any essential difference. Neither does Brunner regard man as possessing the point of contact without dependence upon God. As far as we have been able to follow the controversy between Barth and Brunner, it appears actually to close with indications of agreement" (pp. 116 f.; cf. pp. 123 f.; 183 ff.).

Such a sequel to the debate, however, by no means implies that the controversy concerning natural theology is an exclusively "interdialectical" matter. In all of the history of theology, both in Protestantism and in Catholicism, Barth beholds the history of the disastrous influence of natural theology on the Christian faith. It is the danger against which he warns, in his earliest writings and in his latest (pp. 148-54). It is, accordingly, the problem of natural theology which gives us an insight into the homogeneous character and continuity of Barth's thought, in spite of its varieties of appearance (pp. 154; 195 f.).

Benktson believes that Barth is determined by two considerations whose expressions run counter to one another in his theology. There is the well known tendency to speak of God as the living and acting God, and there is the no less well known philosophic assumption of the absolute qualitative distinction between God and man. One result of these cross currents in Barth's theology is his threefold division of the word of God. Barth is not able to adhere to his own thought that the word of God is identical with the living, acting God Himself whose word is His act. If Barth had been able to carry through this thought in his theology, the human form of God's word need not have become a problem for him. The word would not then have a threefold division. The human form itself would be God's word. However, the assumption of absolute qualitative distinction between God and man inevitably determines Barth's thinking concerning Scripture, resulting in a separation of the human from the Divine. "God's Presence in the Word becomes a Presence in the primary aspect of the Word, whereas the Word in its secondary, human aspect only points toward the real revelation" (p. 199). For man who is on earth, the word of God in its secondary aspect is only a step which leads upward to the revelation of God who is in heaven (p. 200).

Noting that Barth's interpretation of the sacraments involves criticism of Lutheran Christology, the author observes that, since Calvinistic criticism of Lutheran Christology always inserts this in the extreme distinction between the Divine and the human, a framework within which Lutheran theology does not work, the result is always that the Lutheran theology is viewed as leading to a deification of human nature. "Barth's judgment is, therefore, in no sense unique; on the contrary, the reaction is very common in theology which on the whole is influenced by Calvinism" (pp. 203 f.). Since, in Barth's thinking, there

is a gulf fixed between Christ's humanity and Divinity, it is impossible to unite Christ's presence in the Sacrament of the Altar with the humanity of Christ. Because of the rift between the Divine and the human, Barth cannot freely develop the thought of the Living God who is near to man and deals with man, and who does not, because of that intimate association with the human and the earthly, lose something of His heavenly Deity (p. 208). In Barth's teaching concerning the sacraments, that which comes to the fore is the finger of John the Baptist pointing toward Christ, not the very hand of the Living God raised in blessing (p. 206). "The significance of baptism is just that of making evident something which takes place, not on earth through earthly means, but in heaven" (p. 213). The reality is not localized in the water of baptism, any more than the Presence of Christ in the Sacrament of the Altar is involved in the bread and wine. Christ can not be under the elements of this world. The reality belongs to the heavenly sphere (pp. 213 f.).

The difficulty involved in the infinite qualitative distinction between God and man also constitutes a problem for Barth in his thinking about the Church (p. 221). While the Church is a means which God *can* use, God is not bound by the Church. The Church, moreover, never *is* Church but always becomes Church anew (p. 222). The Church occurs when the congregation assembles (p. 223). The Church is *Christ's* Church in the same way that the Word is *God's* word. It would appear, however, according to Benktson, that the antithesis between the heavenly and the earthly cuts the Church into two parts. Just as Christ must, so to speak, have His humanity authorized or justified by being declared to be pre-existent, and just as the Word under the earthly aspect is not seen as God's word but is concealed by the human form, the Church on earth is only the earthly form in which Christ's "own" heavenly body appears (p. 226). In relation to God, the Church is an earthly and human reality of which God assuredly makes use. The Church, however, can never accomplish God's work except in an indirect way (p. 228). Although the time of the Church is not, of course, apart from a relationship to eternity, the Church as such belongs to that which stands in contrast to eternity (p. 231).

In Barth's teaching concerning creation, one recognizes again the difficulty caused by his philosophical assumption of a chasm between the Divine and the human (pp. 233 f.). Benktson feels strongly that

Barth's account of creation is speculative and metaphysical rather than biblical (p. 237). It seems to be self-evident to Benktson that the analogical character of creation as expounded by Barth involves a concept of revelation which is altogether different from the interpretation that "God actually reveals Himself, descends from His heaven and reveals Himself in human form on earth, lives, acts, and intervenes" (p. 241). This latter concept of revelation, continues the author, is the only adequate defence against natural theology. All of Barth's theology may be described as an extraordinary attempt to accomplish without this latter view of revelation that which can only be accomplished when the latter view is accepted as a prerequisite (pp. 241 f.). "God, the God of heaven is also the God of the earth. The earth is not something which is separated from Him. The relationship between God and the created world is not characterized by *analogy* but by *presence*" (p. 245).

The fundamental antithesis indicated in the Bible is not that of God and man. The antithesis is God and devil (p. 245; cf. p. 249). The antithesis thus stated is "quite foreign" (p. 245) to Barth, in whom "one can point out various statements which disclose a certain disinclination to reckon with an evil power ruling man" (p. 246). The result is that evil is only relatively evil, a matter of limitation. But sin, according to Benktson's interpretation, is the expression of a power hostile to God.

> As the creation of God, man is good, and it is a denial of God's creative power to want to see that which distinguishes the being who has gone forth from God's hand in worthlessness and limitation. But it is a denial of the reality and power of evil to want to limit sin to such worthlessness and limitation. Just as surely as man considered as God's creation is good, just as surely is man actually evil when under the power of the devil (p. 247).

Man, as "the old man," is under the devil's power (p. 248). It is always a triumph for the new man when the natural man is crushed, "and, most profoundly viewed, it is God who then triumphs over the devil" (p. 250). "Where there is faith there is all that can be given to man in *regnum gratiae*, yes, God Himself is present there. But faith can never be kept without battle against all that would take it away from man. . . . Man possesses faith only through persevering conflict . . ." (p. 252).

In Barth's view, the gospel is declared to have priority in relation

to the law (p. 253). The gospel is the content of the law. The law is the form of the gospel (p. 254). By being near to us in the fact of his distress, the neighbor has the sacramental significance of being a carrier of God's mercy (pp. 255 ff.). In the fact of the neighbor's wretchedness Barth beholds likeness to the crucified Christ. Man, in the fact of his misery, is representative of Christ. Reminding me of the Crucified, the neighbor is thereby reminding me of my own sin and need of forgiveness. He is a visible symbol of God's invisible grace which does not leave me alone in this world but rather cares for me. Since the neighbor has such significance for me, I must love him. He has a justified claim on my love (p. 256). The law, accordingly, has need of evangelical motivation (pp. 257 ff.; pp. 261-64). However, the narrow scope which the love commandment receives in Barth, by being directed only to those who belong to Christ's Church, forces an enlargement of the conception of the Church (p. 260). According to Barth, we find ourselves in the Christological realm when the New Testament speaks of the state. The state is a secondary Christological annex to the Church (p. 260). According to Benktson's view, Barth does not allow the character of the commandment as clear and unconditional law to come to expression, and, consequently, the character of the gospel as gospel is also obscured (pp. 266 ff.).

Benktson's book represents thorough scholarship and careful exposition. Even though the reader may dissent from some of the author's views, he will be rewarded by the learning, industry, and patience which have entered into the making of this significant work.

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Learning and World Peace: Eighth Symposium. Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, editors. Published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc., and distributed by Harper and Brothers, New York and London, 1948. xix and 694 pp. $6.50.

He would be foolhardy who would presume to "review" the proceedings of the eighth meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion held in September 1947 to discuss ways in which

"scholarship can contribute to the relief of international tensions." The report of these proceedings, published in a thoughtfully edited volume, is a review of the major cultural problems facing the contemporary world. In a series of forty-nine papers, each sharpened by critical comments of other scholars in the Conference, an attempt is made to relate existing knowledge to tensions operating in the world. Although the authors and their critics reach no definitive solutions, they have, as a group, made two significant contributions to a better understanding of problems facing us today.

First, by the collaborative "interdisciplinary" nature of their deliberations, they have emphasized the complexity of the problems confronting mankind. The importance of this can not be exaggerated in a time when frenzied "investigations" and headline solutions obscure mundane realities in a fog of hysteria and verbalisms. It is merely begging the question to expect these proceedings immediately to reach the man in the street. The governance of a world of two billions of peoples is no simple matter, and it is a task for the genius of man in all its forms, artistic, scientific, economic, and political, working simultaneously on a number of fronts to fashion the beginnings of such a planetary structure. This volume is an encouraging symbol of a cooperative approach to the over-all problem.

Second, in his reflective moments, the thoughtful man today is humble in the face of his own ignorance and welcomes the first signs of new knowledge. The scholars, members of the Conference, have brought forth an imposing, if tentative, synopsis of the state of those very knowledges man needs if he is to move toward a more harmonious order in the world. And there is reason for hope that this panorama of ideas is as encouraging as this volume describes it. For this volume is an optimistic one. The contributors, acutely aware of the limitations of our present knowledge, seem to agree that learning can contribute to world peace. In this respect, they belie the all too popular demoralizing notion that the future of mankind is subject to blind, uncontrollable forces. They see present ignorance as but one of the obstacles to overcome.

As might be expected, the thought of this group presents a typically, though not exclusively, Western pattern. At the risk of over-simplifying their ideas, and, with the necessity of omitting reference to many

papers which add to the sum total of the volume, the group has developed a thesis in which four elements stand out:

(1) that "tension" is, by definition, a necessary condition in the life cycle of all things organic; and, further, that tension alone can provide the dynamic for changes in organic life. (Cf. explicitly the papers by Bokser [pp. 511-18] and Friedgood [pp. 435-61].) This element is particularly crucial, because so much contemporary thought tends unconsciously to equate tension and disaster. Seen as a characteristic of the organic, tension has a philosophically and politically neutral connotation.

(2) that the constructive resolution of tensions is a function both of the value systems of the parties experiencing the tensions *and* the processes or channels devised to provide a release for these tensions. (Cf. especially the papers by Finer [pp. 1-19]; Breen [pp. 192-199]; and Johnson [pp. 392-99].) Here the Conference struck its major dilemma: certain that the essential value system we need today must be directed toward the enhancement of human dignity, they are either uncertain or silent about ways of establishing this type of definition as a global common denominator.

Citing this latter weakness is not designed to labor the obvious, but rather to stress one of the areas for statesmanship among scholars in the years immediately ahead. What can the historian, the anthropologist, the social psychologist, the linguist, the studious man of affairs tell us about the gulf between East and West, the mistakes of the one no less than the virtues? We need this "learning" for the use of the politician and diplomat who are building the bridges over that gulf.

(3) that this value system, to become universal, must protect diversity, the whole being a new kind of social amalgam. (Cf. the papers of Angell [pp. 81-89]; and Cole [pp. 418-34].) Here, again, are new tasks for scholars. The world has had a not inconsiderable experience with this problem. All the great migrations of history have compelled men to face the problem of establishing unity from diversity; and the great areas of social ferment in the contemporary world—the Soviet orbit, China, North America, South East Asia, the Middle East—can be construed as laboratories for scholars, whatever their particular discipline, to study ways by which man has sought to achieve social unity.

(4) finally, that "common carriers" for this value system must be found if adequate channels (or processes) for releasing tensions are to be devised. The Conference tended to stress, or to assume, Community, in both a narrow and a broad sense, as this common carrier. Brownell's paper (pp. 336-57) lamented the disintegration of the community in Western Culture, but implied the possibility of a much more forthright attempt to plan for community through a study of the impact of technology upon people. (Cf. in particular the discussion [pp. 355-57]; also papers by Eliot [pp. 161-

82]; Schilpp (pp. 300-10); and Garnett [pp. 329-35], especially the comment by Wieman [pp. 334-35].) Our knowledge of community is yet to be born. What community means may well become the object of our most concentrated scholarly efforts.

This volume is, furthermore, a plea for perspective. Man always forgets that the broad tracks of the present, in appearing to merge at a tiny distant point, are really no broader than that point on the horizon. If the assignment of scholarship today seems a stupendous undertaking, it is probably no greater than that of the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages or the scientists, philologists, and philosophers of the Renaissance. The mountains of inertia, ignorance, and superstition in these earlier periods make our contemporary problems seem simple by comparison, especially as we realize what facilities we have in our quest for knowledge. In this realization, there is hope for the scholars who are the architects, the poets who are the legislators, and the statesmen who are the engineers of tomorrow's world.

The eighth meeting of the Conference, in itself an act of faith, urges upon scholars a faith in the possibilities of that world. Since the times are critical, it is well that we guard that faith jealously. Perhaps, with this impressive start, the Conference will devote itself to an exposition of the major researches and investigations under way in the world today in this broad area, an exposition which might well throw into sharp relief the learning necessary to make world peace a living reality.

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Anti-Semite and Jew. By JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Translated by GEORGE J. BECKER. New York: Schocken Books, 1948. 153 pp. $2.75.

It is probably not necessary to recommend Sartre's writings; he is being read. This particular work is intriguing as an attempt to wrestle with a pressing social issue from within a framework of atheistic humanism and a pessimistic metaphysics. Can such a philosophy avoid ethical nihilism? Sartre believes it can, and *Anti-Semite and Jew* is a brave rendering of that conviction.

For, if nothing else, Sartre's brand of existentialism seeks to force

responsibility upon man. "It is *by my agency* that everything must happen"—so the hero of *The Age of Reason* sums up the point of view. We can dispense with the hypothesis of God all right, but Sartre would ally himself with the religious prophet who castigates the conservative believer for complacently waiting upon God to accomplish the miracle of social regeneration. The author tells us that merit, like truth, must be sought. But "the anti-Semite flees responsibility as he flees his own consciousness"; his is the "fear of being free." The Jew-hater consequently "finds the existence of the Jew absolutely necessary. Otherwise to whom would he be superior?" (pp. 27, 28). As a Manichee he sees his enemy as the incarnation of Evil; hence "he is under no necessity to look for his personality within himself" (p. 21).

The anti-Semite is a pathological being, a victim of passion. Sartre's description of how the anti-Semitic mind operates is brilliant for its psychological insight. Jew-hatred "is an involvement of the mind, but one so deep-seated and complete that it extends to the physiological realm, as happens in cases of hysteria" (p. 11). For example, some men suddenly become impotent when they discover that the woman with whom they are having an affair is a Jewess. The reader may be tempted to ask whether there is an empirical basis for many of Sartre's contentions. One cannot always be sure that some of the author's stories and striking illustrations stand for objective events rather than being simply parables or images intended to drive home the point. This is particularly true in his later characterization of the Jew. It should be noted that, with one or two minor exceptions, the book limits itself to the French scene. Hence Sartre cannot be held accountable for a correct interpretation of, say, the situation in America. *Anti-Semite and Jew* serves to remind us that America is not alone in its Jewish "problem."

From this reviewer's own investigations and experience, Sartre's portrait of the anti-Semite is accurate, at least in the sense of being true to the situation in this country. We are told that the writer "questioned a hundred people on the reasons for their anti-Semitism" (the milieu of a Left Bank café might not exactly reproduce the controlled conditions of a public opinion poll, but, conceivably, it might be more human) and how the Jew-hater's attitude toward the Jews was never based on experience but on the prejudgments which he always brought to particular situations. "Far from experience producing his idea of

the Jew, it was the latter which explained his experience" (p. 13). A classmate of Sartre at the lycée was failed in his *agrégation* the same year a Jew passed. "You can't make me believe that that fellow, whose father came from Cracow or Lemberg, understood a poem by Ronsard or an eclogue by Virgil better than I." On closer questioning, Sartre discovered that his associate looked at the examination as a worthless academic enterprise and had not prepared for it. We have an example here of an individual resembling "those madmen who, when they are far gone in their madness, pretend to be the King of Hungary but, if questioned sharply, admit to being shoemakers" (p. 12).

In addition to moral cowardice and fantasy, anti-Semitism involves "impenetrability" and "mediocrity" (pp. 18-32). Some people want to be impenetrable; they have a fear of themselves and of the tentativeness which is implied in the seeking of truth. They prefer passion to reason and research. A strong emotional bias is the only thing that can give them certainty. Anti-Semitism is also an attempt to "create an elite of the ordinary," to merge with the herd and its morality. As an anti-Semite, a man does not have to act or think on his own.

Although Jew-hatred is fundamentally irrational, it nevertheless proceeds from out of a certain intellectual framework (pp. 33-50). As against the "spirit of analysis" in which bourgeois democracy was born, anti-Semitism has fallen back on a "spirit of synthesis," which means the conviction that a whole is more than, and determines the meaning of, its parts. For example, courage is not an *analyzable,* autonomous element which preserves itself indifferently when it enters either a Christian or a Jew. There is a Jewish *character* which, upon contact, alters courage. Jewishness is a "metaphysical essence." This gives us a key to understanding how the enemies of the Jews can talk of contradictories like "Jewish capitalism" and "Jewish Bolshevism" in the same breath. The Jew cannot be expected to act rationally; he may even choose his own destruction. Furthermore, in order that the anti-Semite may really hate him, the Jew must possess freedom; we do not hate natural phenomena. But, of course, such freedom is not freedom for good. Like Augustine's man after the Fall, the Jew is free only to do evil. Sartre writes, "there is only one creature, to my knowledge, who is thus totally free and yet chained to evil; that is the Spirit of Evil himself, Satan."

This brings us to the essence of anti-Semitism. Sartre combines the

note of responsibility as a goal (from which man often tries to escape) with a philosophy of metaphysical hopelessness, the latter of which is reminiscent of Bertrand Russell's conviction that life is ultimately meaningless, but that man should struggle against fate with all his might.

> The anti-Semite is afraid of discovering that the world is ill-contrived, for then it would be necessary for him to invent and modify, with the result that man would be found to be the master of his own destinies, burdened with an agonizing and infinite responsibility. Thus he localizes all the evil of the universe in the Jew. If nations war with each other, the conflict does not arise from the fact that the idea of nationality, in its present form, implies imperialism and the clash of interests. No, it is because the Jew is there, behind the governments, breathing discord. If there is a class struggle, it is not because the economic organization leaves something to be desired. It is because Jewish demagogues, hook-nosed agitators, have seduced the workers (p. 40).

This is the Sartrian explanation of anti-Semitism. Man attempts to escape from the agony of being free. Another must be responsible for evil: the Jew. The Jew *is* Evil. We are told "that the anti-Semite does not have recourse to Manichaeism as a secondary principle of explanation. It is the original choice he makes of Manichaeism which explains and conditions anti-Semitism."

It is interesting to reflect that the atheist Sartre and the Christian theologian join in presenting freedom as the occasion for human sin. The difficulty with Sartre's interpretation is that, while it may help to explain hatred, it does not explain Jew-hatred. It is too general. Why do we select the Jew? A possible way out might be that a particular historical and experiential situation has potentialized the Jew as a scapegoat. But Sartre cuts off this possibility. In the opening pages of the book it is denied that the anti-Semite is inspired by such external causation. Not only does anti-Semitism develop apart from experience in general; more specifically it is not explainable by historical data, e.g., how many Jewish soldiers there may have been in 1914 (pp. 13-16), or by "social facts," e.g., that there may seem to be too many Jewish doctors (pp. 16 f.). Even if every Breton were a physician, we would merely remark that Brittany provides doctors for all of France. Further along, the author admits that "if the anti-Semite has chosen the Jew as the object of his hate, it is because of the religious horror that the latter has always inspired," but he denies that this explains modern

anti-Semitism (pp. 67 f.). Sartre underestimates the religious element in hatred of the Jews.

Our author is in the nebulous state of explaining an empirical situation with no empirical data to buttress his hypothesis. Why not express our Manichaeism in the form of hatred of red-heads? If the Jew is selected as Satan it must be that he either performs a unique function or represents a particular challenge. Where, for example, the Jew is looked upon as the representative of a God of justice (which opinion has actually been historically expressed) and where men are seeking to escape blame for their own refusal to further justice, then, by means of an unconscious psychological process, the Jew can conceivably become the real instigator of injustice. We project upon the Jews our own guilt, having already become incensed at these people for giving Amos and Isaiah to the world. The present reviewer has no desire to campaign for such a theory at the moment; he is simply presenting a sample way of filling in what is to him a fatal gap in Sartre's otherwise provocative analysis. We should add, on the author's side, that Sartre does not look at anti-Semitism as unique. "The Jew only serves [the anti-Semite] as a pretext; elsewhere his counterpart will make use of the Negro or the man of yellow skin" (p. 54). But Sartre would then seem to be forced into the admission that the choice of the Jew is simply an accident. Can this explain the tragic fury and universality of anti-Semitism?

Space prohibits more than a mention of two additional and more ultimate queries. Why is man afraid of freedom? And why does he have a sadistic longing for Evil? (pp. 45-50).

The remainder of the book is an attempt to analyze who and what the Jew really is and to present "a basis for stating the conditions on which a solution [to the Jewish problem] might be envisaged" (p. 143).

To return to the problem of an analytic versus a synthetic anthropology, the Jews' one friend, the democrat, made a wrong choice of analysis back in the eighteenth century (pp. 55 ff.). The democrat is no real protector of the Jews for "he resolves all collectivities into individual elements." Consequently, he has no deep feeling for the Jew or the Negro. He wishes to destroy the Jew as a Jew and to leave nothing in him but the man; the anti-Semite wants to destroy the Jew as a man and leave nothing in him but the Jew, the untouchable. Sartre agrees with the anti-Semite in denying that there is a "human nature"

made up of wholly isolated elements. But the Jew-hater goes astray in his application of the spirit of synthesis; he comes out with an evil Jewish principle. Sartre's own constructive interpretation (pp. 59 ff.) involves the conviction that man is a being in a particular situation and

> forms a synthetic whole with his situation—biological, economic, political, cultural, etc. He cannot be distinguished from his situation, for it forms him and decides his possibilities; but, inversely, it is he who gives it meaning by making his choices within it and by it. To be in a situation . . . is *to choose oneself* in a situation. . . .

Sartre does not deny that the Jews are a race, but not in the sense of an "indefinable complex" of physical, intellectual and moral traits. The Jews do have common ethnic characteristics, but these are limited to various "inherited physical conformations" found more frequently among Jews than among Gentiles. It may be better to say Jewish *races.* We cannot claim that all Jews show the same character traits. A particular Israelite is an "inseparable ensemble in which the psychical and the physical, the social, the religious, and the individual are closely mingled. . . ." He can be adequately defined neither by his religion nor by his existence in a strictly Israelite national community. The one thing that all Jews have in common is their common situation, but —and this is important—non-Jews have placed them in this situation. In principle, the Jews are assimilable; Gentiles won't let them assimilate. *We have created the Jew.* "The Jew is one whom other men consider a Jew: that is the simple truth from which we must start." Sartre is right that Jewishness is largely a Gentile decision, something that makes considerably irrelevant discussions among Jews over whether they are a people or simply representatives of a religion as the Protestants are. But there are some people, among both non-Jews and Jews, who will deny that the Jews have had nothing to do with an autonomous choice of their own national and/or religious character, anti-Semitism or no anti-Semitism. In any event, the Israelite's plight is tragic:

> Whatever he does, his course has been set for him. He can choose to be courageous or cowardly, sad or gay; he can choose to kill Christians or to love them; but he cannot choose not to be a Jew . . . if he does so choose, if he declares that Jews do not exist, if he denies with violence and desperation the Jewish character in himself, it is precisely in this that he is a Jew (p. 89).

Within this fateful context there yet remains a choice. A man can decide whether to be an "authentic" Jew (pp. 90-91, 136-41) or an "inauthentic" Jew. Briefly, authenticity means accepting one's condition as a Jew, with all the incumbent responsibilities and even martyrdom that this entails, while the inauthentic Jew tries to flee his situation. We as Gentiles can never *blame* the Jew if he takes the latter course. Such a choice "does not concern us"—by which Sartre, magnificently, implies the dignity of the person.

There follows a long description of inauthenticity (pp. 91-136). A sufficiently clear distinction between Sartre's own interpretation of the Jewish outlook and the anti-Semitic mythology is not always evident here. We are told of the Jew's inferiority, his pathetic search for security, the perpetual tensions in which he lives, his own anti-Semitism, his masochism, his undue rationalism, his attitude to his own body and to property, his "uncultivated spontaneity," his uneasiness. The description is shrewd, but some of Sartre's generalizations may be questioned (something which likewise holds in his analysis of the "democrat"). The tension remains between those who, in hesitating to present a conclusion without exact scientific data, are led to perfectionism and silence and those who proclaim the essence of human relationships through intuition and poetic insight, thereby running the risk of arbitrariness.

The authentic Jew accepts his place as a proscribed and untouchable being—but he asserts his being on that very basis. Sartre appears naïve in holding that authenticity "takes away all power and all virulence from anti-Semitism." Then the anti-Semite "must be content to yelp at the Jew as he goes by, and can no longer touch him." But the author is quick to add that the authentic response only makes its contribution on the level of ethics and integrity; it does not solve the social or political problem, even among Jews themselves.

It is in Sartre's solution to the Jewish problem, or his "basis for stating the conditions for that solution," that this reader experienced a distinct letdown. In contrast to the author's superb analysis of the psychopathic character of Jew-hatred, we are told that deliverance will come through an alteration in the pattern of social organization! Sartre admits that education may not accomplish much and that laws "will never embarrass the anti-Semite, who conceives of himself as belonging to a mystical society outside the bounds of legality." And the

practice of "good will" easily plays into the hands of the Jew-hater (pp. 70, 72). But then Sartre presents his trump card:

> . . . anti-Semitism would have no existence in a society without classes and founded on collective ownership of the instruments of labor, one in which man, freed of his hallucinations inherited from an older world, would at long last throw himself wholeheartedly into *his* enterprise—which is to create the kingdom of man. Anti-Semitism would then be cut at its roots (p. 150).

Thus there appears an underlying conflict in the author's understanding. The Jewish problem is initially placed on the level of personal responsibility and freedom. But Sartre ends up in objectivication: the environment, the social situation must be transformed. We will change people by changing the social structure. This sentimental outcome hardly accords with Sartre's genius at other points. He contradicts his earlier insight that social evil is traceable to an internal, personal flight from freedom. At best Sartre ends up with a half-truth. If "to be in a situation . . . is *to choose oneself* in a situation," social reorganization may fulfill a positive function, but what about the *self* and its psychopathic tendency and irresponsibility? Why won't these latter exert themselves in a classless society?

Sartre's intellectual contribution is matched by his compassion for the Jews. His is a keen and empathic understanding of how horrible it must be to be a Jew. But he never loses sight of the Jew as an individual, as an autonomous being, with the image of his true self by no means destroyed. Sartre confesses the guilt of Christians and Gentiles and recognizes that the Jews can be delivered from their plight only by non-Jews, who bear the ultimate responsibility. We have in this study a matchless description of the diabolism of the anti-Semite and of how contemporary anti-Semitism manifests itself. It is a pity that this is unaccompanied by any real contribution either in a comprehension of the ultimate *why* of anti-Semitism, of how it is that the *Jews* are selected for perpetual and universal crucifixion, or towards a solution of this dreadful social malady.

A. Roy Eckardt

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BOOK NOTES

The Resurrection in Ezekiel XXXVII and in the Dura-Europos Paintings. By HARALD RIESENFELD. Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1948. 40 pp. Kr. 1:50.

Dr. Riesenfeld's paper from Volume XI of the *Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift* discusses but one panel of the Dura paintings, that numbered 20 in the edition of Du Mesnil du Buisson, which represents the vision of Ezekiel concerning the valley of dry bones that were given life. The writer stands with those who claim that we do not need to look to Persia for the currents of thought which started the development in the Old Testament of a doctrine of the Hereafter. That Persian ideas did play a part in the development of that doctrine he would not deny, but he is convinced that even in pre-exilic days the peculiar conception of *life* in the Old Testament, in particular the covenant relation of the people in communion with Yahweh, the giver of life, had led to a conviction that Yahweh would lead His people through death to renewed life. This, he thinks, was symbolically represented to the people annually at the New Year Festival, during which the king, as representative of the people, was ritually slain after battle with the forces of Chaos and Darkness, and ritually resurrected to a new life, which, of course, was promise of renewed life to the people. The king was thus a "giver of life." But there were other figures who were also symbolic "givers of life": e.g., Elijah, who raised the son of the widow at Zarephath; Elisha, who brought back the Shunnamite's child to life; and Ezekiel, with his valley of bones. It is as such a symbolic figure that he interprets the Ezekiel of the Dura painting and suggestively links it on with the great "life-giver," the Messiah.

A. J.

The Messianic Theme in the Paintings of the Dura Synagogue. By RACHEL WISCHNITZER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. xii, 135 pp. with 31 pages of drawings and reproductions. $6.00.

At the moment, the prize piece in the New Museum at Damascus is the reconstructed Dura Synagogue. When the reviewer visited the place in the Easter of 1947, the Museum Guide allotted to us insisted that, first of all, we must visit the Synagogue, and was still full of the tale of how Professor Kraeling of Yale had been there day after day during the previous summer. It is a wonderful thing, the crudity of its art as compared with other things one can see in that Museum, being, like the crudity of the mosaics at Beth Alpha, an element in its wonder. It will doubtless continue to call forth much discussion to lengthen the already impressive Bibliography given in the present book.

Mrs. Wischnitzer-Bernstein worked on a Research Fellowship from the American Academy for Jewish Research in the years 1940-43, and though she has published a number of papers on various aspects of the problem of

the paintings in the synagogue, this is, apparently, her definitive publication of her results. The visitor to the reconstructed synagogue gets the impression that the paintings are decoration, used also perhaps for instruction, like those in Oriental Churches, with the subjects drawn from biblical and post-biblical story. The author, however, has a theory that there is a unitive pattern, that the subjects have been chosen and arranged in serial order, and painted in special symbolic fashion, so as to set forth a definite Messianic conception. So her book takes up the panels one by one, in the order she thinks they were meant to be read by the third century worshipper coming into the synagogue, and interprets the various figures and decorative details as she thinks they illustrate her theory.

This reviewer is quite unconvinced. The author seems to be forcing on the pictures a highly artificial schematization, and reading into them a very great deal that is not there, using what is pure assumption with regard to the meaning of some element in one panel as the sure ground of interpretation for some detail in another. By using precisely the same kind of argumentation, one could easily work out a fanciful over-all schema for the wall paintings of the Abyssinian Church at Bahardar Giyorgis, or those in the Chapel of the Coptic Patriarchate at Jerusalem, where we know, as a matter of historical fact, that there was no pre-conceived scheme for the paintings. One can even think of alternative over-all schemes which, by similar process of reasoning, might be forced on these decorations of the Dura Synagogue. Had some one the leisure, it might be interesting to work one of these out.

The great value of this publication is that it gives so many of the panels in illustration, and gathers together in one book, convenient to handle, so full an account of the various pictures, together with the relevant discussion of them to date. The author's care in discussing the coloring of the pictures even offsets the disadvantage that the reproductions had to be without color. The Chicago University Press has done an excellent job in the production of the book, and it is just too bad that labor costs have forced the price up to a figure which puts the book out of the range of the majority of students.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

The Birth of the Christian Religion. By ALFRED LOISY. New York: Macmillan Company, 1948. 413 pp. $5.00.

The late Abbé Loisy died in 1940, during the German invasion of France. *La Naissance du Christianisme* (1933), his *Remarques sur la Littératur épistolaire du Nouveau Testament* (1935), his smaller book, *Le Mandéisme et les origines chrétiennes* (1934), and *Les Origines du Nouveau Testament* (1936) may be taken as setting forth his final views on Christian origins. The present work is a translation of the first of these, made by the veteran editor of the *Hibbert Journal,* Dr. L. P. Jacks. Professor Gilbert Murray has contributed an interesting preface, in which he stresses the importance of the modern view of New Testament, as contrasted with the traditional view:

The actual Christian literature proves on examination to be so different from what it seems. The Gospels, which look at first sight like simple lives of Jesus, prove on analysis to have had quite a different purpose and also to have been exposed to varied and incalculable influences in the interests of different doctrines and communities. It is only of recent years that scholars have begun to understand how different from a modern book, printed off in a thousand or so uniform copies, was the nature of an ancient book written out copy by copy; how different again the book which, although written, is still in the main merely an instrument for oral recitation, liable to be improved or altered according to circumstances or the taste of the reciter; different again the book of devotion or edification meant to enforce or correct the rites and beliefs of a community.

He also emphasizes—as we expect him to emphasize—the importance of the Hellenistic religious scene upon which early Christianity emerged: "The crude contrast between 'Christian' and 'Pagan' is really a false one. The idea of a son of God born to save the world is essentially a Greek idea. All the Greek-speaking populations of the Levant were permeated by the old agricultural worship of the Renewal of Life in the New Year after the dead winter."

But one does not read far before he realizes that the Abbé's source analysis of the New Testament books, and especially his dating of the documents, are peculiarly his own; that some of this is quite fantastic; that his interpretations are highly individualistic—Loisy worked too much "in lonely isolation, fancy free"; and that he had a rather superficial understanding of ancient Judaism. There are many good things in the book, but these are coupled with such extravagant and far-fetched interpretations, set forth without supporting evidence, that we must say this is no book for the beginner, or for the non-expert in New Testament studies; the wheat can be sifted from the chaff only by one who is already fairly familiar with the modern historical-critical study of Christian origins.

And let it be added that this criticism is made reluctantly. If the reader is old enough to recall the great days of Loisy's reply to Harnack's *Wesen des Christentums* (in *L'Évangile et l'Église*, 1902), or his stimulating commentary on the first three gospels, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques* (1907-08), or his brilliant first edition of *Le Quatrième Évangile* (1903), a profounder work than the second edition (1921), he will know what I mean. Loisy's learning was enormous, his critical sense was sharp and daring, his religious feelings were still sensitive. Perhaps the vicissitudes and misfortunes of his ecclesiastical career explain the growing aberration and individualism of his later work; whatever the explanation, his later writings were scarcely on the level of the earlier.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Paul as Experient. By H. B. SHARMAN. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. [135 pp.].

This study is based on selections from the Acts and from the Letters of Paul; precise in its title, it explores with singleness of purpose the core of

Paul's religious experience, and the conditions which he fulfilled in order to find access to God. Dr. Sharman's point is that these essentials in Paul's experience, as distinguished from his sometimes unconvincing and dated interpretation of that experience, are sound guides for religion today.

Designed for use in a group, this book, well wrought, spare and of a Quaker plainness, is the product of a lifetime of work and experimentation with student groups. Of its author it may be said as Paul said of himself, "I had rather speak five words with my understanding that I might instruct others also, than ten thousand unintelligible words." Dr. Sharman's studies in the life and teaching of Jesus have been finding fit audience for thirty years and more; *Paul as Experient* is of the same pattern as these books, and has the same enduring quality.

NETTA HARDY MCNEILL

The Inquisition at Albi, 1299-1300. Text of Register and Analysis. By GEORGENE WEBBER DAVIS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948. (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Number 538.) 322 pp. $4.00.

This book consists of an introduction in four chapters, an edition of the text of Bibliothèque Nationale MS. Lat. 11847, three appendices, bibliography and index. Miss Davis discusses the evidence of the manuscript, along with the opinions of previous investigators and a variety of related data, on the nature of the Inquisition trial of twenty-five or twenty-six persons for the heresy of Catharism. Our author makes a considerable revision of the view of Lea and Vidal, which was that the accused were good Catholics, suddenly and arbitrarily punished, and points to evidence that about half of them were apparently connected with families that had been affected by heresy. She recognizes, however, with these authors, the fact that they were propertied citizens, and is inclined to believe that the bishop, Bernard de Castenet, who "stood in pressing need of money" for his building enterprises and was evidently unscrupulous, took advantage of their implication in heresy, and pushed the action against them in order to secure funds from their estates. The argument follows cautious lines, and while the probabilities are revealed in a convincing way, nothing beyond probability is claimed. One difficulty lies in the possibility that, as was charged at the time by the Franciscan, Bernard Délicieux, the records of the depositions were tampered with. The manuscript, which is in an early fourteenth century hand, is adequately described, and Miss Davis has evidently taken pains to produce a faithful transcription.

J. T. MCN.

Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Vol. XVII. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., Inc., 1948. xxviii, 131 pp. $3.50.

Of the collection of papers published here, the one selected for consideration in this review, because of its special interest to readers of *The Review of*

Religion, is the essay by Professor Leo Strauss on "How to Study Spinoza's *Theologico-Political Treatise.*" It is one of the few critical approaches in English to the more practical of Spinoza's two major works. Professor Strauss's full-length study of the *Treatise, Die Religionskritik Spinozas als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft,* appeared in 1930.

The essay as a whole is more concerned with the internal criticism or "interpretation" of the *Treatise* than with its historical and psychological "explanation." The first part (pp. 69-89) concludes that Spinoza's rules for reading the Bible (in general, to study it in the light of its "history") would not apply to his own work, since it is composed in a more intelligible form. But we are justified in a certain amount of historical study, says Strauss, because of the unforeseeable change in philosophical language since Spinoza's time. The second part (pp. 89-97) considers the class of readers principally addressed by the *Treatise,* "the potential philosophers among Christians," and what this may mean. The last part speaks more positively than the first two. It gathers up various previous matters, considers real or apparent contradictions (not only within the *Treatise* but between it and Spinoza's other works), and advances as "typical difficulties" Spinoza's habit of caution or "exoterism" (i.e., speaking *ad captum vulgi* or *alicuius*) and "the necessary simplification" (i.e., restricting criticism usually to the Old Testament and Maimonides). The *Treatise,* states Strauss, is "largely unintelligible" while such difficulties remain unappreciated.

Professor Strauss sums up his method as follows:

> The sound rule for reading the *Treatise* is, that in case of a contradiction, the statement most opposed to what Spinoza considered the vulgar view has to be regarded as expressing his serious view; nay, that even a necessary implication of a heterodox character has to take precedence over a contradictory statement that is never explicitly contradicted by Spinoza. In other words, if the final theses of the individual chapters of the *Treatise* (as distinguished from the almost constantly repeated accommodations) are not consistent with each other, we are led by the observation of this fact and our ensuing reflection to a consistent view that is no longer explicitly stated, but clearly presupposed, by Spinoza; and we have to recognize this view as his serious view, or as the secret *par excellence* of the *Treatise.* Only by following this rule of reading can we understand Spinoza's thought exactly as he himself understood it and avoid the danger of becoming or remaining the dupes of his accommodations (p. 115).

He concludes: "The practical proposals together with the obvious reasoning are that part of the teaching of the *Treatise* that . . . must be understood completely by itself before its hidden teaching can be brought to light" (p. 131). He suggests, however, that the latter "teaching" may be "non-theological" or "strictly atheistic" (p. 118). The former "part" is Spinoza's "plea for 'the freedom of philosophizing', and therefore for 'the separation of philosophy from theology' " (p. 121).

Professor Strauss may be considered too extreme in his persistently reiterated distinction between what he thinks is Spinoza's implicit and explicit

teaching—he admits "exaggeration" more than once. He shows great diligence in collecting proof-texts in support—not always direct—of his construction of Spinoza's meaning. He points out real difficulties, but the proposed solutions are often still more difficult. One cannot escape the impression that the whole context into which Professor Strauss tries to fit both his own interpretations and the Spinoza references is a preconceived system, corresponding not to Spinoza but to himself. Nevertheless, the essay repays its reader with considerable heuristic value.

FRANK M. VANDERHOOF

Existentialisme théologique. By ENRICO CASTELLI. Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1948. 96 pp.

The Director of the Institute of Philosophical Studies at the University of Rome has written this volume, the first in a series of philosophical studies to be published in France under his direction. He gives a timely reminder, in this day when we hear so much of neo-Thomism, that Roman Catholicism still has room for considerable variety of philosophical judgment. For Castelli hardly stands in the main stream of Catholic thought, and his book offers interesting comparisons with recent Thomist attempts to evaluate the current flurry of secular existentialism, as well as the somewhat older development of Protestant Christian existentialism.

The Catholic who would do justice to existential thought usually asks how the voluntarism and anti-rationalism of existentialism can be tamed by the authoritarianism and rationalism of Thomism. Thus Jacques Maritain, who is about as existential as a Thomist can be, finds the true existentialism to be that of Aquinas. But, says Maritain, St. Thomas' existentialism "everywhere associates and identifies being and intelligibility." When existentialism is so broadly defined, any distinctive meaning of the word is all but lost.

Castelli, in contrast, by emphasizing neither authoritarianism nor presuppositionless rationalism, is able to give real appreciation to the existential insight. Like most Catholic thinkers, he shows a nostalgia for the philosophy of the Middle Ages. But his rationalism is far less confident than that of the neo-Thomists, and he frankly admits that revelation is the presupposition of medieval philosophy. Thus he is in a favorable position to do justice to the existential insights of such thinkers as Pascal and Buber.

But Christian existentialism, says Castelli, is not irrationalism or individualism. Rather, he finds religious existentialism to be in revolt against modern philosophies of solitude. And here he argues his case persuasively. Those who have followed Sartre's recent political utterances will have no trouble in agreeing that the existentialist cry for individual freedom cannot find an answer in a totally empty world, but must seek some context. "L'Engagement" is not the solitary struggle for freedom, but a social obligation. For Castelli, the context of decision is not just society but the God and the world of medieval metaphysics.

Granting that Castelli's interpretation of medieval philosophy and of Catholicism is more friendly to existentialism than is usual, we must ask whether it is a correct interpretation. He supports his case by insisting that Catholicism has always recognized the insufficiency of reason. But it is one thing to say, with St. Thomas, that reason has limits, and quite another to argue that reason must proceed upon the basis of faith. Maritain is surely more correct in holding that St. Thomas established the "autonomy of philosophy"; within its sphere reason was fully competent. Castelli is in closer agreement with heterodox Catholicism, Protestantism, various brands of existentialism, and the scepticism of logicians like Bertrand Russell, when he says that reason can function only with presuppositions and a context which it cannot provide itself. Indeed, is not Castelli's position—that metaphysics is theology and depends on revelation (p. 78)—the very "theologism" which Gilson deplores in Bonaventura? Castelli can find support in the Middle Ages, but not in that Middle Ages which Catholic doctrine has made normative.

The religious analysis in this provocative book is perhaps more convincing than the philosophical argument. It will be possible to accept Castelli's existential insight without agreeing that the Kantian criticism is the prime villain of modern thought. Many will not accept the dilemma that we must either follow the sceptic way to solipsism or return to medieval metaphysics. One can appreciate the meaning of the I-Thou encounter without wishing to repeal Kant's *Critiques*. Whitehead suggested that one of the strengths of Christianity is that it is not tied to any particular metaphysic—that, in contrast to religions of "applied metaphysics," it is a "religion seeking a metaphysic." Perhaps the continuity of the Christian faith, in its passage through many metaphysical climates, is in the recurrent existential insight.

ROGER L. SHINN

What Can We Believe? By VERGILIUS FERM. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948. xi, 211 pp. $3.00.

We are finite beings dealing with infinite problems, and there is no shortcut to this kind of understanding. We are simply seekers after truth, and it will not come to us without seeking. We can have partial knowledge of what is beyond, provided it is forged on the anvil of experience, and it is enough to compel our absolute commitment. To those who want to believe, and who have found in the traditional doctrines nothing but barren ground rather than food for the soul, Dr. Ferm addresses these pages. He sets up his standards of reasonableness and proceeds immediately to clear away the rubbish of false beliefs which so often acts as a barrier to any intelligent commitment. He then sets up his definitions of religion and of being religious prior to facing the questions of specifically Christian beliefs.

What results is a religion of human discovery, based on a very human Bible, human experience, and reason. Without such safeguards, even "respectable" people will fall for all sorts of superstition, as, for example, the religion of

Father Divine. The proper "atmosphere" of religion is portrayed by Jesus. Various churches attempt to express this atmosphere in terms of social relations, and the "ideal Christian church will express in social relations ideal Christianity." We need an institutional church to express these ideals. He suggests a hypothetical church to which he would like to belong, and, because no such church exists, it might be advisable to hold membership in more than one communion.

The final chapters deal with Fate, Chance, Suffering, and Immortality. There seems to be a great deal of Fate over against human freedom; suffering is to be faced with the right attitude; and there is a transcendent spirit within us. We go beyond logic here, but the feeling of "must" causes us to assert such a faith.

This book is written for the lukewarm, and there is no doubt that Dr. Ferm has accurate feelings about those who have become doubters and indifferent to organized religion. He is correct, also, in his belief that such people will not respond to a neo-orthodoxy or to beliefs which cannot be supported by evidence. He is aware that a religion for today must reflect the thought-patterns of today's culture. But the book remains as lukewarm as the proposed reader to which it is addressed, because it never transcends the culture to which it speaks. It lacks the great convictions of Christian faith, not because its conclusions are tentative, but because it does not reach to the center of the problems of living or to the basic elements in Christian faith. It is the "religion of Jesus" approach, popular earlier in this century in terms of Darwinism and progress, adapted to our feelings of frustration after two World Wars but not coming any closer to the fundamental issues.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER

America's Spiritual Culture. By BERNARD E. MELAND. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. 216 pp. $2.50.

Dr. Meland writes as a stanch religious liberal. He has a genuine concern that the influence of religion upon contemporary culture in America be increased, but, at the same time, he is convinced that this culture itself has a spiritual dimension and an authentic spiritual quality. His thesis is that some basis broader than the formula of separation of church and state must be found on which to relate religion to the corporate life of the nation. "The peace between church and state in the American commonwealth," he writes, "has been a costly one for both state and organized religion. It has reduced religion to a social activity upon the periphery of public affairs and has left the state to pioneer its course in the perspective of a secular society."

Readers of Henry Nelson Wieman's books will note the similarity between his philosophic approach and that of Dr. Meland, whose position may be characterized as naturalistic in that he rejects a "final and absolute discontinuity between religion and nature." Instead of a supernatural order of phenomena, he finds a continuity between phenomena at the material and the

spiritual levels. The discontinuities occur within "a total pattern of continuity." Man is an "emergent" characterized by a unique "psychical thrust."

Yet Dr. Meland does not avoid an ultimate dualism, at least a formal dualism, as the following passage shows: "The summit of man's spiritual emergence is his awareness of an ultimate concern, a concern that extends appreciation to the farthest bounds of being and impels him to relate his life to what is the sovereign source of every existent thing, namely, the Creativity that is shaped by God into meaning and value." It is doubtful if any "naturalistic" theologian has wholly assimilated the concept of deity to the framework of his thought. An authentic urge takes possession of him to transcend the bounds of secularist philosophy. "The scope of man," writes Dr. Meland, "the creature participating in a venture of cosmic proportions, must be recovered in our thinking. The reality of suffering and tragedy and the overcoming of the tragic sense through grace and redemption must again be made vivid to us." This is the voice of orthodoxy in its newer and more sophisticated form.

But if theologians are intrigued by such language, *as churchmen* they are rudely challenged by the author, who regards the church as a feeble resource: "To individuals within their respective traditions it can minister; but to society as a democratic culture, struggling for its life and for the realization of its ends, the church as an insulated tradition seems to have no significant voice." The needed synthesis of religion and culture must be a "compromise." The church must not control the culture, nor must the culture rob the church of its autonomy "in matters of individual human destiny, which go beyond the empirical order." The church remains "the instrument of society by which an active life of devotion to God, the Source of all value, is maintained."

Nevertheless, Dr. Meland seems to expect far less impetus from institutional religion than from education, family life, and the cultural renaissance implicit in contemporary regionalism.

F. Ernest Johnson

Trends in Protestant Social Idealism. By J. Neal Hughley. New York: King's Crown Press, 1948. xiv, 184 pp. $3.00.

This volume is a study of the social philosophy of a group of American Protestant Christians, including E. Stanley Jones, Charles Ellwood, Francis J. McConnell, Kirby Page, Harry Ward, and Reinhold Niebuhr, in whom the author seeks to discover significant and varying currents of thought in what he terms the social gospel. The social gospel is defined explicitly as a current of social thought rising in American Protestantism about 1850 and extending to the first world war. "It is to this specific era in the United States—with its distinctively this-worldly outlook on political problems, with its fever for cultural progress, with its anti-theological bias and its faith in scientific method, with its pragmatic mentality in regard to the meaning of Christianity and its social task—that we give the name social gospel" (pp. 4-5).

The chapters consist of interpretive studies of the major emphases of each man's social thought, ranging from E. Stanley Jones' "Kingdom of God Idealism" to the "Christian Marxism" of Harry Ward, from the "Christian Sociology" of Ellwood to the "Dialectical Theological Socialism" of Reinhold Niebuhr. The reader gets an impression of the variety of views and opinions gathered under the large and commodious (if somewhat leaky) roof of American Protestantism. One gets also the impression from most of the men studied of a generous but futile idealism. These are good men who have exhorted their fellows to be good. They have had the generous vision of a goodness which embraces society as well as individuals. (Whether this is quite as unique a phenomenon as Mr. Hughley contends, is, I think, somewhat open to question.) But it is a goodness which has had all too little rootage in the facts of the human situation, and so it is advice to a great extent which has gone unheeded. As one reads Mr. Hughley's record, one understands why.

The inclusion of a chapter on Reinhold Niebuhr and a final chapter entitled "Neo-Protestantism Versus Social Gospel Idealism" appears as the author's attempt to take account of recent currents of Protestant social thought. He seems to feel that "Neo-Protestantism" is hostile to social gospel idealism, and that Niebuhr's thought is both ambiguous in its basic definitions and pointed away from society and its concerns. This last charge (elaborated on page 128 and elsewhere) seems particularly open to question. Moreover, the author's value judgments have a way of showing through his vocabulary. Thus, for example, he speaks of Niebuhr's "tirades" against the Marxists. Again, he seems to miss the point of some rather important aspects of Niebuhr's thought in such statements as that "human history is a vast zig-zag drama between Creation and Parousia." After two readings of the final chapter, this reader finds himself unable to say precisely what Mr. Hughley thinks of the issues between "Neo-Protestantism" and "Social Gospel Idealism" beyond the fact that he seems to like the latter and dislike the former.

But with these exceptions, it is possible to say that this is a useful study of a significant chapter in the history of Christian social ethics.

JOHN A. HUTCHISON

The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God. By CHARLES HARTSHORNE. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948. xvi, 158 pp. $2.75.

In what respects is God absolute and in what respects relative? Or is it meaningless to say that he is both? In a rigorously analytical study Professor Hartshorne explains why he thinks both statements are necessary.

God's absoluteness, he argues, must be defined in terms of relativity as such and, therefore, cannot be independent of relativity in every sense, though it can be independent of which relations there are. It need not imply his nonrelationship to the created world but only to its contingent alternatives. If all things are relative, then at least relativity itself must be invariant. The relative or changeable, that which depends upon and varies with varying relation-

ships, includes within itself and in value exceeds the non-relative or absolute, as the concrete includes and exceeds the abstract. But the absoluteness is definitely there as an abstract aspect or dimension of the supreme being. In its total concrete reality the supreme is the supereminent case of relativity, the "Surrelative," just as in its abstract character it is the supereminent case of non-relativity—not only absolute, but *the* absolute.

God is therefore both absolute and relative, much as, with qualifications in both cases, light is both corpuscles and wave-lengths. The absolute is a divine object within a divine subject, the eternal adequacy of type within the divine relational acts. In agreeement with the *Timaeus,* God is both abstract eternal Reason and concrete World Soul. The rational purpose is eternal, but the concrete acts which achieve the purpose do so only by embracing in themselves all contingent relationships.

The mistake of scholasticism came from the belief that the knower is made inferior by the relation of dependence to the known. As Professor Hartshorne says, there is a type of dependence which we detest, but there is also a type we admire. The sensitiveness of the knower to what he knows is good. The mistake of absolute idealism came from its attempt to identify the absolute with the all-inclusive. The all-inclusive, because of the necessary externality of some of its relations, cannot be absolute, but it can include an absolute.

The absolute, then, is an abstract feature of the inclusive and supreme reality which is the personal God. The supremely excellent is that individual Being than which no other individual Being could conceivably be greater, but which itself in another state could become greater. The problem of limitations for God is thus met by saying that, for God, self-superiority is possible. There is a Being which surpasses all others at any given time but itself only in a subsequent state. God is absolute, yet related to all. He is also supreme, yet indebted to all. In agreement with Whitehead, Professor Hartshorne thinks of God as the supreme beneficiary or recipient of achievement.

One comes from this book with new confidence in the ability of philosophy to attack religious problems and, through careful analysis, to reveal what as alone conceivable must be true.

J. S. Bixler

Edvard Rodhe: en hyllning av ordinarie ledamöter inom teologiska fakulteten. (*Lunds universitets årsskrift.* N.F. Avd.1. Bd 45. Nr 2) Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1948. 101 pp. Kr. 4.

A *Festschrift* in honor of the Vice-Chancellor of Lund University, Bishop Edvard Rodhe, on the occasion of the abolishment of an office provided for the Bishop of Lund in the original charter of 1666, an administrative office for which there seems to be no further need. The volume consists of the following contributions by Bishop Rodhe's distinguished colleagues: (1) "Lutheranism and Church Union," by Anders Nygren; (2) "Sephiroth and Abbia' in Their Theoretical Connection," by Hugo Odeberg; (3) "Lutheran Theology in the

Face of Ecumenical Work," by Ragnar Bring; (4) "The Liturgical Handkerchief in Folk Tradition and in Actuality," by Hilding Pleijel; (5) "Diocesan Government in the Swedish Church," by Sven Kjöllerström.

Man's Disorder and God's Design. The Amsterdam Assembly Series. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. 858 pp. $5.00.

A one-volume edition of four books written in preparation for the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches, in which the main theme for discussion is considered under four aspects: Vol. I, "The Universal Church in "God's Design"; Vol. II, "The Church's Witness to God's Design"; Vol. III, "The Church and the Disorder of Society"; and Vol. IV, "The Church and the International Disorder." In his General Introduction, Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, Chairman of the Study Department Commission, defines the task of the Council as follows: "It must seek to comprehend Man's Disorder in the light of God's Design, in order that the churches may mediate to the world both a true understanding of its distress and the grace and power to find the way out."

Art and Faith: Exchange of Letters between Jacques Maritain and Jean Cocteau. Translated by JOHN COLEMAN. New York: *Philosophical Library,* 1948. 138 pp. $2.75.

The interest of this book for a student of religion lies not so much in the abstruse and sometimes *précieux* discussion of the relation of art and faith between the philosopher, Maritain, and the poet, Cocteau, as in the realm of psychology. For these letters reveal much of importance for the understanding of the psychology of conversion, and, especially, the phenomenon of conversion of modern sophisticates such as Cocteau and Maritain to Roman Catholicism.

General Evangeline Booth of the Salvation Army. By P. W. WILSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. vii, 264 pp. $3.50.

This first full-length biography of one of the most remarkable women of our time is useful both as a revealing study of character and as a history of the Salvation Army itself. For Evangeline Booth was born the year of its founding, and her life has been completely identified with its development. It is truly a stirring and invigorating tale of a faith that moved mountains, and, throughout, Evangeline Booth appears as, not exactly a saint, perhaps, but every inch a soldier!

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